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Deporting Undesirable Women
Pooja R. Dadhania
Immigration law has long labeled certain categories of immigrants
“undesirable.” One of the longest-standing of these categories is women
who sell sex. Current immigration laws subject sellers of sex to an
inconsistent array of harsh immigration penalties, including bars to entry
to the United States as well as mandatory detention and removal. A
historical review of prostitution-related immigration laws reveals
troubling origins. Grounded in turn-of-the-twentieth-century morality,
these laws singled out female sellers of sex as immoral and as threats to
American marriages and families. Indeed, the first such law specifically
targeted Asian women as threats to the moral fabric of the United States
due to their perceived sexual deviance. Subsequent laws built upon these
problematic foundations, largely without reexamining the initial goal of
safeguarding American morality from the ostensible sexual threat of
noncitizen women. This dark history casts a long shadow, and current
laws remain rooted in these archaic notions of morality by continuing to
focus penalties on sellers of sex (who tend to be women), without
reciprocal penalties for buyers (who tend to be men). Contemporary
societal views on sellers of sex have changed, however, as society has come
to increasingly tolerate and accept sexual conduct outside the bounds of
marriage. Although societal views surrounding prostitution remain
complex, there is an increased understanding of the different motivations
of sellers of sex, as well as a recognition that individuals forced into
prostitution are victims who need protection. Prostitution-related
immigration laws should be reformed to no longer penalize sellers of sex,
both to bring immigration law in line with modern attitudes towards
sellers of sex and to mitigate the discriminatory effect of the archaic and
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INTRODUCTION
Ms. Zhang1 is a Chinese woman who fled to the United States over twenty
years ago to escape horrific persecution. She was granted asylum, but her story does
not end there. Ms. Zhang struggled to get on her feet in the United State as a result
of ongoing psychological trauma and limited English proficiency. A few years after
she received asylum, Ms. Zhang had her first contact with the criminal justice
system when she was arrested in a neighborhood known for prostitution.2 She was
1. Name has been changed to protect her privacy.
2. This Article will use the term “prostitution” to refer to the sale of sexual services, which is
the term used in immigration and criminal laws. This Article will use the term “sellers of sex” to refer
to individuals who provide sexual services in exchange for money, goods, or services, including both
those who sell sex as a result of force, fraud, or coercion, and those who choose to sell sex. This Article
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not convicted of any crime. It is not clear whether Ms. Zhang in fact engaged in any
prostitution-related activities. However, over the next few years, due to her actions
or perhaps the fact that she was in locations where prostitution occurred or was
now suspected by the police to be involved in prostitution, she continued to be
targeted for arrest.3 She was convicted of a few prostitution-related misdemeanors
for intent to engage in prostitution. Ms. Zhang served hardly any prison time.
Ms. Zhang applied for lawful permanent resident status and her application
was denied due to her prostitution-related convictions.4 Although the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) often initiates removal proceedings after denying
applications for such status, it did not try to deport Ms. Zhang because prostitutionrelated crimes are not considered serious enough to warrant the deportation of an
asylee who fears persecution in her home country.5 Almost a decade later, after no
new contacts with the criminal justice system, Ms. Zhang again applied for lawful
permanent resident status, and her application remains pending. If it is approved
and she receives lawful permanent resident status, she could face deportation if the
police target her again for prostitution-related crimes because lawful permanent
residents, unlike asylees, can be deported for prostitution.6
Ms. Zhang’s experience highlights many of the troubling facets of
prostitution-related immigration laws, which have long-labelled noncitizens like her
“undesirable.”7 First, there can be grave immigration consequences for selling sex,
or even being suspected of selling sex, despite minimal criminal penalties. Second,
prostitution-related immigration laws have targeted sellers of sex, who are often
female. Third, immigration law treats prostitution-related conduct inconsistently,
mandating severe penalties while at the same time providing for relief, waivers, and
exceptions.

acknowledges that prostitution, even when it is a choice, can be exploitative and the result of structures
of oppression. See Corey S. Shdaimah et al., Introduction to CHALLENGING PERSPECTIVES ON STREETBASED SEX WORK 9 (Katie Hail-Jares et al. eds., 2017) (“[T]his form of work is often exploitative, and
in a world that is overwhelmingly capitalist and patriarchal, viewing sex work as a fully free choice
separate from structures and mores of oppression may be unrealistic or naive.”). This Article does not
use “prostitute” (except when referring to or quoting from legislation, case law, or other historical
sources), which can be a stigmatizing term that has social and moral undertones. This Article uses “sex
worker” or “sex work” only in relation to the voluntary sale of sex as a form of employment.
3. See infra note 248 (discussing arrests for prostitution based on stereotyping); see also THE
URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, REVOLVING DOOR: AN ANALYSIS OF STREET-BASED PROSTITUTION IN
NEW YORK CITY 5, 40–42 (2003), http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/RevolvingDoor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PD5L-W6A4] (describing the harassment of sex workers in the form of false
arrests).
4. With her application for permanent resident status, Ms. Zhang applied for a waiver of
inadmissibility to overcome her prostitution convictions, but it too was denied. See infra note 178 and
accompanying text (describing waiver of inadmissibility).
5. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012).
6. See infra Part II.B (describing the crimes involving moral turpitude ground of deportability).
7. See infra Part I (describing how legislators labeled noncitizens involved or suspected of
involvement in prostitution “undesirable”).
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The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prescribes significant penalties
for prostitution and related conduct. Selling sex can bar noncitizens from entering
the United States, through either the denial of a visa or entry at the United States
border under the inadmissibility grounds.8 Prostitution-related activities can trigger
removal proceedings to deport a noncitizen, even a lawful permanent resident,
under the crimes involving moral turpitude deportability provision.9 Such activities
can also subject a noncitizen to mandatory detention during the pendency of
removal proceedings.10 Notably, certain penalties apply only to sellers of sex, and
not to buyers.
To understand the current state of prostitution-related immigration laws,
namely the focus on sellers of sex, this Article analyzes the historical development
of such laws. Tracing this evolution, Part I shows that prostitution-related
immigration laws developed primarily in the late 1800s and early 1900s to respond
to the singular concern about the threat of the sexuality of noncitizen women to
American morality. Part II analyzes the current legal landscape of prostitutionrelated immigration laws, which reveals that these morality-based origins continue
to permeate the laws through a continued targeting of sellers of sex, generally
women. Part III discusses contemporary societal perceptions of sellers of sex,
illustrated by criminal law, and shows that sellers of sex generally are no longer
viewed as immoral even though views on prostitution remain complex. In light of
changed perceptions of sellers of sex, Part IV recommends that prostitution-related
immigration laws be reexamined and ultimately reformed by Congress and
reinterpreted by the courts to no longer penalize sellers of sex.
Especially under the Trump administration, immigration penalties are a real
threat to noncitizens suspected of prostitution. Immigration law has long been a
tool that has been manipulated to target vulnerable and unpopular groups, and it is
now being wielded like a blunt instrument by the Trump administration. Any
noncitizen who has a run-in with law enforcement, whether ultimately convicted or
not, is at risk of deportation under this administration’s policies.11 These policies
8. See INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D); INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Admission is defined as “lawful entry of the alien into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(13)(A).
9. INA § 237(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
10. INA § 236(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody
any alien who . . . is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1182(a)(2) . . . .”). Section 212(a)(2) of the INA includes the prostitution-related ground of
inadmissibility, in addition to the crimes involving moral turpitude ground. INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(2).
11. This administration is explicitly targeting for removal noncitizens who “have been convicted
of any criminal offense” and noncitizens who “have been charged with any criminal offense that has not
been resolved.” See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. et al., Enforcement of the Immigration
Laws to Serve the National Interest 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PT3W-DPY6] (emphasis added). Fears of deportation are not unfounded—
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are especially problematic in the context of prostitution, where a conviction is not
needed for immigration penalties to attach, and where women like Ms. Zhang can
be arrested and charged, but later have their charges dropped.12 Eliminating
immigration penalties for prostitution thus offers a small but significant step
towards protecting vulnerable populations that have had a long history of being
targeted by morality-based provisions.
I. HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION-RELATED IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION
Prostitution-related immigration laws have a dark history—under the
justification of protecting “American” morality, they labeled noncitizen women as
“undesirable” and targeted them for their perceived sexuality.13 Conceptions of
American morality around the turn of the twentieth century accepted sexual
intercourse only within the confines of monogamous marriage. Even when they
were forced into prostitution, women, especially noncitizen women, were blamed
as the primary threats to monogamous marriage, rather than the men who bought
sex. The first federal prostitution-related immigration law in 1875 targeted
noncitizen women, focusing on Chinese women, who were viewed as sexually
deviant and thus serious threats to white families.14 The bulk of prostitution-related
immigration laws developed in the next several decades, continuing to use the
protection of American morality as their justification to single out noncitizen
women for increasingly harsh penalties.
A. Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration ( Page Law) (1875)
The first federal immigration law to target prostitution was the Page Law,
enacted in 1875.15 The Page Law, passed in the context of rising anti-Chinese
sentiment, targeted Chinese women as “undesirable” immigrants due to the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents have targeted noncitizens at their court
appearances, including at the Human Trafficking Intervention Court in New York City, which is
designed to provide rehabilitative services to individuals charged with prostitution. See Beth Fertig,
When ICE Shows Up in Human Trafficking Courts, WNYC ( June 22, 2017), http://www.wnyc.org/
story/when-ice-shows-court/; see also Press Release, Immigrant Def. Project, IDP Unveils New
Statistics & Trends Detailing Statewide ICE Courthouse Arrests in 2017 (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ICE-Courthouse-Arrests-Stats-Trends2017-Press-Release-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y3G-LC8A] (reporting over 1200% increase from
2016 to 2017 in reports of ICE arrests or attempted arrests in New York courts).
12. See JOHN F. DECKER, PROSTITUTION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 104–06 (1979); supra
note 3 (describing false arrests to harass individuals suspected of prostitution and arrests based on
stereotyping). Additionally, because a conviction is not needed to trigger the prostitution inadmissibility
ground, even an arrest for prostitution can arouse the suspicion of immigration officials and
adjudicators. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 647 (2005) (“[R]egulation of marriage and the family and the implementation
of population policy are at the root of much of American immigration law.”).
14. Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration (Page Law), ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477
(1875) (repealed 1974); see also infra Part I.A (discussing the legislative history of the Page Law).
15. 18 Stat. 477.
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perceived threat they posed to American morality through their potential to bring
prostitution to the United States and thereby corrupt white families.16
The Page Law restricted the entry of women coming to the United States to
engage in prostitution, and specifically targeted women from East Asia for
additional restrictions.17 Section 5 made it unlawful for “women ‘imported for the
purposes of prostitution’” to “immigrate into” the United States.18 Noncitizens
were subject to screening upon arrival in the United States to determine whether
they were coming for purposes of prostitution.19 Section 1 specifically targeted
individuals from “China, Japan, or any Oriental country” for additional screening at
a port of embarkation to determine whether they had “entered into a contract or
agreement . . . for lewd and immoral purposes.”20 Women from these Asian
countries needed to obtain certificates of immigration before embarking for the
United States.21 This section also criminalized the importation of women into the
United States for the purposes of prostitution.22
Rising anti-Chinese sentiment in the wake of increased Chinese immigration
to the United States was the backdrop for the Page Law, as white Americans felt
threatened by the changing character of California.23 Less than a decade after the
enactment of the Page Law, Congress passed the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act
in 1882, which further codified this anti-Chinese sentiment by halting the
immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States, in addition to barring Chinese
individuals from naturalizing.24 In the midst of this anti-Chinese hostility, the Page
16. Not only was the Page Law the first federal immigration law to target prostitution, it was
also the first federal immigration law to restrict generally the entry of “undesirable” noncitizens into
the United States. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY 1798–1965, at 66 (1981) (“From this beginning [the 1875 Act], exclusion was to develop into
a major instrument of immigration policy.”). Before 1875, states generally individually regulated
immigration. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19–43 (1996) (describing state laws regulating immigration prior
to the Page Law); Abrams, supra note 13, at 645, 664–77 (same).
17. In addition to prostitution, the Page Law also imposed penalties on the importation of
coolie labor, which had previously been criminalized by the Coolie Trade Prohibition Act. See §§ 2, 4,
18 Stat. 477; Act of Feb. 19, 1862 (Coolie Trade Prohibition Act), ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (repealed 1974);
see also RONALD J. TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN
AMERICANS 36 (1990) (defining the term “coolie” as “unfree laborers who had been kidnapped or
pressed into service by coercion and shipped to foreign countries”).
18. § 5, 18 Stat. 477.
19. Id. This screening upon arrival in the United States was not limited to Asian women. See id.
20. Id. § 1; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 641, 695–96.
21. § 1, 18 Stat. 477; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 698–702 (discussing immigration process
for Chinese women under Page Law).
22. § 3, 18 Stat. 477 (making it a felony for “knowingly and willfully import[ing], or caus[ing]
any importation of, women into the United States for the purposes of prostitution . . . .”). In addition
to targeting prostitution, the Page Law made it unlawful for “persons . . . undergoing a sentence for
conviction in their own country of felonious crimes” to enter the United States, excluding political
prisoners. Id. § 5.
23. The first Chinese immigrants arrived in California in the late 1840s, and by 1880, there were
over 75,000 Chinese immigrants in California. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 649–50.
24. Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
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Law was passed to protect white American families from the perceived sexual threat
of Chinese women.25 The perceived threat was two-fold—the threat that permitting
the entry of Chinese women would bring prostitution to the United States as well
as lead to the birth of Chinese-origin United States citizens, further decreasing the
percentage of white Americans and changing the character of the electorate on the
West Coast.26
Before the passage of the Page Law, President Ulysses Grant addressed
Congress in 1874, calling for immigration legislation against the “evil practice” of
prostitution by Chinese women.27 He explained that “[h]ardly a perceptible
percentage of [Chinese women] perform any honorable labor, but they are brought
for shameful purposes, to the disgrace of the communities where settled and to the
great demoralization of the youth of these localities.”28 The legislative history of the
Page Law mirrors President Grant’s views and shows that the legislation’s
uncontroversial goal was to protect white families from the perceived sexual
deviance of Chinese women by restricting their immigration.29 California
Congressman Horace F. Page, the bill’s sponsor, explained the purpose of the Page
Law as curbing the decline that Chinese women were causing in the morality of
white Americans in California. He described white Americans as “stout-hearted
25. In particular, Americans focused on the differences between prevailing sexual norms in
China and the United States—most notably prostitution, but also concubinage and polygamy, which
were accepted in Chinese society. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND
THE NATION 136 (2000); Abrams, supra note 13, at 642–43. In 1870, an estimated fifty to seventy
percent of the over two thousand Chinese women living in San Francisco were sellers of sex. See
GEORGE ANTHONY PEFFER, IF THEY DON’T BRING THEIR WOMEN HERE: CHINESE FEMALE
IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION 6, 11, 124 n.13 (1999); BENSON TONG, UNSUBMISSIVE WOMEN
15 (1994); JUDY YUNG, UNBOUND FEET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF CHINESE WOMEN IN SAN
FRANCISCO 19, 45–46, 320 n.89 (1995). But see COTT, supra note 25, at 137 (“The Page Act was sparked
less by the scale of Chinese prostitution, which was small, than by what it banefully represented.”).
26. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 661–63 (arguing that Chinese women who emigrated to the
United States were viewed as presenting a “threat of reproduction” through the potential for the birth
of Chinese-origin United States citizens and for miscegenation).
27. Id. at 691 (quoting 3 CONG. REC. 3–4 (1874)).
28. Id. (quoting 3 CONG. REC. 3–4 (1874)); see also HUTCHINSON, supra note 16, at 65 (citing
S. 971, 37th Cong. 1188 (1861); H.R. 1588, 37th Cong. 3895 (1861)). Even though there was a
recognition that Chinese women could be forced or coerced into prostitution, they were nevertheless
viewed as a threat because their perceived “slavish character” made them more susceptible to being
forced or coerced. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 658 (“White women ‘so much better understood’ their
rights that they were less likely to be duped into indentured servitude and were therefore less of a moral
threat” (quoting S. REP. NO. 44-689, at 146–48 (1877) (statement of Alfred Clarke, Clerk at the San
Francisco Police Department)).).
29. See COTT, supra note 25, at 137–38 (“The Chinese prostitute, standing outside of and boding
no good for Christian-model monogamy, signified the threat to American values in Chinese
immigration . . . .”); Abrams, supra note 13, at 692–95 (detailing legislative history); supra note 25
(describing the differences in sexual norms between the United States and China and providing
estimates of the rate of prostitution among Chinese women in San Francisco); see also STAFF OF
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 7 (Comm. Print
1988) (“[The Page Law] was unaccompanied by printed reports or any House or Senate floor debate,
apparently because of its noncontroversial nature.”).
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people” who had come to California “with their wives and children,” but were now
threatened by a “deadly blight.”30 His bill aimed to “‘place a dividing line between
vice and virtue’ and ‘send the brazen harlot who openly flaunts her wickedness in
the faces of our wives and daughters back to her native country.’”31 Senator
Cornelius Cole described Chinese women as “the most undesirable of population,
who spread disease and moral death among our white population.”32 These
statements, which cast blame for prostitution solely upon noncitizen women,
conspicuously fail to mention the role of buyers, a pervasive theme in prostitutionrelated immigration legislation.
The practical effect of the Page Law was an almost complete halt of the
immigration of Chinese women.33 The Page Law, which remained on the books for
almost a century, was only the beginning of morality-based immigration legislation
targeting noncitizen women as the bad actors.
B. An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into The United States (1903)
In 1903, Congress passed a comprehensive piece of immigration legislation
that strengthened the provisions of the Page Law for the same purpose—to protect
American morality from noncitizen women.34 This law did not single out any
particular race like the Page Law and was used to begin targeting new communities
of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe in addition to Asian women.35
The 1903 Act enumerated expansive “classes of aliens” who were “excluded
from admission into the United States.”36 These classes included “prostitutes, and
persons who procure or attempt to bring in prostitutes or women for the purpose
of prostitution.”37 This inclusion was uncontroversial—the legislative history found
30. Abrams, supra note 13, at 694 (quoting 3 CONG. REC. APPX. 44 (1875)).
31. Id. at 692–95 & n.331 (quoting 3 CONG. REC. APPX. 44 (1875)).
32. Abrams, supra note 13, at 663 (quoting Cornelius Cole: The Senator Interviewed by a Chronicle
Reporter, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 1870, at 1).
33. See COTT, supra note 25, at 138 (discussing the impact of the Page Law on the population
of Chinese women in California); PEFFER, supra note 25, at 9 (describing how government officials
“demonstrated a consistent unwillingness, or inability, to recognize [Chinese] women who were not
prostitutes among all but wealthy applicants for immigration”); Todd Stevens, Tender Ties: Husbands’
Rights and Racial Exclusion in Chinese Marriage Cases, 1882–1924, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 272
(2002) (identifying one of the reasons that low numbers of Chinese women immigrated to the United
States as “restrictive U.S. immigration laws, especially those concerning prostitution”).
34. Immigration Act of 1903 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United
States), ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213; see also infra notes 35, 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing the
motivations underlying the passage of the 1903 Act).
35. See MARTHA GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION, AND
CITIZENSHIP, 1870–1965, at 60–62 (2005) (“When the Immigration Acts of 1903, 1907, and 1910
reiterated general restrictions against prostitutes, the application of the policy was redirected toward
new European arrivals.”).
36. § 2, 32 Stat. 1213. The March 3, 1891 Act first enumerated a class of noncitizens excluded
from admission. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
37. § 2, 32 Stat. 1213; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 355 (1950) (“The barring of immigrants
on moral grounds was among the very first exclusion clauses.”). A conviction for prostitution
was not required for exclusion, which remains the law today under the prostitution-related
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it “unnecessary to offer any justification for adding such aliens to the excluded
classes, since they . . . conduce to the moral and physical degradation of the
American people.”38 The 1903 Act explicitly shifted the focus of prostitutionrelated immigration laws to admission and exclusion.39
Although the 1903 Act removed some of the explicit references to women, it
still continued to single them out, implying only women could be sellers of sex.40 It
also retained the language from the Page Law making it a felony for anyone to
import into the United States “any woman or girl for the purposes of prostitution.”41
The 1903 Act’s prostitution-related provisions continued to reflect concern
over the threat of prostitution by noncitizen women to American morality.42
Leading to the passage of the 1903 law, President Theodore Roosevelt encouraged
Congress to take action in his annual message in 1901, finding the “present
immigration laws unsatisfactory.”43 He specifically encouraged Congress to “aim to
exclude absolutely . . . all persons who are of a low moral tendency or of unsavory
reputation.”44 The Industrial Commission, a government agency tasked with
producing reports on various issues including immigration, recommended in 1902
in a draft bill that Congress exclude “prostitutes and persons who procure or
attempt to bring in prostitutes or women for the purpose of prostitution,” which is
language that was adopted wholesale in the 1903 Act.45
The morality-based rationale for prostitution-related immigration laws thus
persisted, continuing to point the finger at noncitizen women. Fears surrounding

inadmissibility ground. See infra text accompanying note 128. In addition to prostitutes, “idiots, insane
persons . . . ; persons likely to become a public charge; . . . polygamists, anarchists, or persons
who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United
States . . . .” were also included in the classes of aliens to be excluded admission. § 2, 32 Stat. at
1213. This Act also included a deportation provision within two years after entry for any noncitizen
who entered the United States “in violation of the law.” Id. § 20.
38. See S. REP. NO. 57-2119, at 2 (1902). The legislative history also justified these provisions
because such noncitizens could “become public charges within a short time . . . .” Id.
39. See § 2, 32 Stat. 1213. Legislative history noted the failure of the Page Law to directly address
admission. See 35 CONG. REC. 5764 (1902) (“The part of the bill in relation to prostitutes and procurers
is to complete the evident purpose of the act of March 3, 1875, which makes the importation of such
aliens a felony, but omits to provide for rejection at ports of the United States.”). The 1903 Act retained
criminal penalties for “the importation into the United States of any woman or girl for the purposes of
prostitution . . . .” § 3, 32 Stat. 1213.
40. See supra text accompanying note 37. Some references to sellers of sex in the 1903 Act were
gender-neutral, whereas the Page Law referred only to women. Compare Page Law, ch. 141, § 5, 18
Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974), with § 2, 32 Stat. 1213.
41. See § 3, 32 Stat. 1213 (emphasis added).
42. These concerns may have been unfounded. See Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage
and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 766–68 & n.29 (2006) (summarizing the scholarship on
whether early-twentieth century reformers identified a true problem or stirred up an unfounded moral
panic).
43. HUTCHINSON, supra note 16, at 127 (quoting 57 CONG. REC. 35 (1901)).
44. Id. (quoting 57 CONG. REC. 35 (1901)).
45. Id. at 128–29 (citing FINAL REP. OF THE INDUS. COMM’N, VOL. XIX, H.R. DOC. NO. 380,
at 1015 (1902)).
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the sexuality of noncitizen women only served to make subsequent laws more
stringent.
C. An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States (1907) and
Amendments (1910)
Several years later, Congress passed comprehensive immigration legislation in
1907 and amendments in 1910, which again toughened the provisions related to
prostitution. The purpose of these laws continued to be the protection of
Americans from the “undesirable” sexual practices of noncitizen women, who were
labeled as bad actors even in cases of forced prostitution.46
Whereas previous laws focused on exclusion at the border, the 1907 Act added
a deportation provision, which enabled immigration officers to enforce
prostitution-related immigration laws in the interior of the United States for conduct
committed after entry. Section 3 of the 1907 Act provided that “any alien woman
or girl who shall be found an inmate of a house of prostitution or practicing
prostitution, at any time within three years after she shall have entered the United
States, shall be deemed to be unlawfully within the United States, and shall be
deported . . . .”47 A conviction for prostitution was not required before a noncitizen
female could be deported.48 This deportation provision reflected Congress’s
new interest in monitoring the behavior of noncitizens after entry into the United
States.
Women continued to be singled out as sellers of sex. The 1907 Act retained
the exclusion provisions from prior legislation and continued to prohibit women
and girls from entering the United States for the purpose of prostitution.49 Congress
also inserted a new provision to exclude “women or girls coming into the United
States . . . for any other immoral purpose,” a catchall term for other undesirable
sexual practices.50 The 1907 Act also modified and broadened the criminal
provisions related to the importation of women and girls into the United States for

46. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United
States), ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898; infra note 52 and accompanying text.
47. § 3, 34 Stat. 898. From 1908 to 1948, 14,814 noncitizens were deported under the provisions
targeting immoral behavior. See S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 873 (1950). This statute also criminalized
harboring any alien woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution. Id. The Supreme Court held that
this portion of the statute was unconstitutional because it encroached on the police powers of the
states. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909). The 1910 amendments to this statute amended the
unconstitutional language of the 1907 Act. Act of March 26, 1910 (An Act to Amend an Act Entitled
“An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States”), ch. 128, § 3, 36 Stat. 263; see
also United States v. Tsuji Suekichi, 199 F. 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1912).
48. See Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 (1914); Ex parte Pouliot, 196 F. 437 (E.D. Wash. 1912).
49. § 2, 34 Stat. 898.
50. Id. Legislative history did not illuminate the meaning of the term “immoral purpose.” See
Dubler, supra note 42, at 770–71. A House of Representatives Report explained only that this language
was added “in order effectively to prohibit undesirable practices alleged to have grown up.” See id. at
770 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 59-4558, at 19 (1906)). The Supreme Court later interpreted this term to
exclude extramarital relations “short of concubinage.” Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559, 562 (1934).
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the purposes of prostitution.51 However, absent from the Act was any mention of
penalties for buyers of sex.
Congress used the 1907 Act to expand the scope of the prostitution-related
immigration laws “‘in order effectively to prohibit undesirable practices alleged to
have grown up.’”52 Although the statute did not target any particular race, Congress
intended to respond to continued concerns about Chinese women entering the
United States for prostitution. The Commissioner-General’s Annual Immigration
reports in the years prior to the 1907 Act insinuated that marriage was being used
as a guise for bringing Chinese women into the United States for prostitution.53
Case law also posits that concerns over the sexuality of noncitizen women
was the primary motivator for the sexual conduct-related provisions in the 1907
Act. The Supreme Court in United States v. Bitty, a case pertaining to the “immoral
purpose” language in the 1907 Act, explained that “Congress, no doubt, proceeded
on the ground that contact with society on the part of alien women [involved in
prostitution] would be hurtful to the cause of sound private and public morality and
to the general well-being of the people.”54 The Court specifically noted that
prostitutes and concubines “must be held to lead an immoral life, if any regard
whatever be had to the views that are almost universally held in this country as to
the relations which may rightfully, from the standpoint of morality, exist between
man and woman in the matter of sexual intercourse.”55
The 1910 amendments to the 1907 Act reflected growing concerns over the
corrupting influence of prostitution by noncitizen women. These amendments
came in the wake of President Taft’s first annual message to Congress, which

51. In addition to criminalizing the importation of any alien woman or girl for the purpose of
prostitution, it criminalized the importation of any alien woman or girl “for any other immoral
purpose.” § 3, 34 Stat. 898. It also criminalized “directly or indirectly” importing or attempting to import
any such person. Id. It newly criminalized harboring any alien woman or girl for the purpose of
prostitution or any other immoral purpose within three years of her entry into the United States. Id.
52.
Dubler, supra note 42, at 770 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 59-4558, at 19 (1906)); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 59-3021, at 19 (1906) (“Section 3. In this section it is attempted to extend the scope of
the law, so far as it relates to the immigration of prostitutes, in order effectively to prohibit undesirable
practices alleged to have grown up.”); H.R. REP. NO. 59-4558, at 2 (1906) (“Section 3: Strengthens the
provisions with regard to the importation of prostitutes.”).
53. See CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE,
AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 30 (1998) (citing TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION (1907); TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION (1906)); Stevens, supra note 33, at 291–92 (citing
TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION 460
(1901)).
54. United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 401 (1908). This case showed some recognition of the
role of men in illicit sexual intercourse, allowing for the prosecution of a man who “imported” a
noncitizen woman for “an immoral purpose, namely [to] live with him as his concubine.” Id. at 399–
400 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 402.
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expressed the need for additional legislation against the importation of prostitutes
into the United States.56
Retaining the prostitution-related exclusion grounds from the 1903 Act, the
1910 amendments expanded existing deportation provisions to further control the
conduct of noncitizens after entry into the United States.57 The amendments
mandated the deportation of any noncitizen who at any time was “found an
inmate . . . of a house of prostitution or practicing prostitution after such alien shall
have entered the United States.”58 The amendments removed the temporal
limitation of three years after entry from the 1907 Act, making the deportation
provisions significantly harsher for noncitizens involved in prostitution as
compared to other classes of noncitizens subject to deportation for conduct after
entry.59 Other noncitizens, including perpetrators of violent crimes, were protected
by time limits.60
Although they made penalties harsher, the amendments removed some
gendered language from the prostitution-related laws. Specifically, the amendments
replaced the reference to women and girls as prostitutes from the deportation
provisions with “[a]ny alien,”61 which was recommended by the Immigration
Commission as a result of findings that males were also coming into the United

56. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 16, at 146 (“[President Taft] mentioned immigration [in his
first annual message] only in connection with the need for legislation against the importation of
prostitutes.”).
57. See Act of March 26, 1910 (An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act to Regulate the
Immigration of Aliens into the United States”), ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 263. The amendments mandated
deportation for a broader class of individuals involved in prostitution, including noncitizens who
managed houses of prostitution, received any part of the earnings of a prostitute, and protected
prostitutes from arrest. Id. § 3. Congress also targeted prostitution in the interior of the United States
through the Mann Act, or White Slave Traffic Act in 1910, which prohibited the importation and
interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36
Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 (2012)). Congress passed the Mann
Act in direct response to growing hysteria that white women were being forced into prostitution and
that prostitution by noncitizens was corrupting American morality. See GARDNER, supra note 35, at 51,
60 (“[C]hanging conceptions of racial otherness and anxieties about the white American family
intersected with long-held concerns over the moral conduct of immigrants to produce the ‘white
slavery’ panic.”). See generally BRIAN DONOVAN, WHITE SLAVE CRUSADES: RACE, GENDER, AND
ANTI-VICE ACTIVISM 1887–1917 (2006) (analyzing anti-vice campaigns to combat “white slavery” and
their impact on racial hierarchy and categorization in the United States).
58. § 3, 36 Stat. 263.
59. See id.
60. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United
States), ch. 1134, §§ 20–21, 34 Stat. 898.
61. Compare § 3, 36 Stat. 263, with § 3, 34 Stat. 898.
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States for prostitution.62 However, references to women and girls remained in the
exclusion provisions.63
Legislative history continued to refer to prostitution using a morality-based
framing. Prostitution was “an evil,”64 and the 1910 Amendments were touted as an
“aid . . . in putting out this immoral fire that is now burning the very vitals out of
society.”65 Immigration laws were increasingly used to target Japanese women, many
of them coming to join their husbands in the United States. They were accused of
misusing marriage to come to the United States for prostitution and accordingly
were disproportionately barred from admission or deported as prostitutes around
this time.66 Public rhetoric on Japanese women mirrored earlier language used to
describe Chinese women—William Gates, secretary of the California State Board
of Charities and Corrections, stated in 1907 in a national address that “the Japanese
are but little better than the Chinese,” and that it was “safe to say that far more than
a majority of these females were prostitutes.”67
Legislative history shows recognition that women involved in prostitution
could be victims, but there was no suggestion of relief or exceptions to penalties for
such women. One representative described some women imported for prostitution
as an “unfortunate class” and as “unwary and unsuspecting victim[s] . . . [who]
62. See 45 CONG. REC. 518 (1910) (statement of Rep. Bennet) (“[F]or those reasons which will
be noted by those who have read the Immigration Commission’s report, we drop the words ‘women
and girls’ from the bill and make the law apply to all aliens who are imported for immoral purposes.”);
U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES: A PARTIAL REPORT
FROM THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION ON THE IMPORTATION AND HARBORING OF WOMEN FOR
IMMORAL PURPOSES, S. DOC. NO. 61-196 at 35 (1909) (“Both from the investigations of the
commission and those of the Bureau of Immigration, it is clear that there is a beginning, at any rate, of
a traffic in boys and men for immoral purposes. . . . [O]ur laws should be so amended as to apply to all
persons engaged in immoral practices.”). But see GARDNER, supra note 35, at 63 n.36 (discussing the
lack of immigration investigations into male prostitution).
63. See § 2, 36 Stat. 263.
64. 45 CONG. REC. 519 (1910) (statement of Rep. Goebel).
65. Id. at 547 (statement of Rep. Cox).
66. See GARDNER, supra note 35, at 38–45 & n.18. Some Japanese women were coming to
the United States as “picture” brides, marrying via proxy marriage Japanese men living in the United
States. See COTT, supra note 25, at 151–55 (describing the “picture bride” marriage practice and the
immigration response by the United States government). The Dillingham Commission, see infra note 70
and accompanying text, expressed concerns about the legitimacy of Japanese wives coming to join their
husbands, stating that “a large majority of women coming in this way are intended for the purposes of
prostitution.” U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, 61ST CONG., IMPORTATION AND HARBORING OF
WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, vol. 19, at 69 (1911) (presented by Mr. Dillingham); see also HARRY
A. MILLIS, THE JAPANESE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INVESTIGATION FOR THE
COMMISSION ON RELATIONS WITH JAPAN APPOINTED BY THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE
CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA 234 (1915) (“Until recently advantage was taken of the admission
of ‘picture brides’ to bring into this country women to be used for immoral purposes.”).
67. GARDNER, supra note 35, at 57 (quoting W. Almont Gates, Oriental Immigration on the
Pacific Coast: An Address Delivered at the National Conference of Charities and Correction at Buffalo,
( June 10, 1909)); see also SIDNEY LEWIS GULICK, THE AMERICAN JAPANESE PROBLEM: A STUDY OF
THE RACIAL RELATIONS OF THE EAST AND THE WEST 15 (1914) (“Japanese are also charged with lack
of all ideas of sex morality . . . . Japanese women are so subservient that they easily become
prostitutes.”).
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become[ ] the property of some debauchee or inhuman monster” upon arrival in
the United States.68 However, he incongruously promoted a “statute strong and
powerful enough to enable the Government to deport persons who, by fraud or
otherwise, enter the ports of the United States for the purposes of prostitution.”69
A report by the Dillingham Commission, created by the 1907 Act to investigate
immigration,70 found that some women were forced into prostitution. However, it
too recommended heightened screening at ports of entry for deportation and other
penalties.71 The report also recommended removal of the three-year limitation after
entry on deportation of sellers of sex, which Congress adopted in the 1910
amendments.72 Blame for prostitution was still being leveled at female sellers of sex
regardless of whether their participation was volitional, due to a singular focus on
the perceived moral harm of prostitution.
D. Immigration Act of 1917
The comprehensive Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 modified the Act of
1907 as amended in 1910.73 The 1917 Act “was designed primarily to exclude aliens
with physical, mental, or moral disqualifications . . . .”74 The legislative history
continued to reflect a consensus that noncitizens coming to the United States for
prostitution were among the most undesirable immigrants.75 Prostitutes thus
remained an excludable class within the 1917 Act, but the earlier references to
women and girls in the exclusion provisions were removed to allow the immigration
laws to capture men.76
The 1917 Act provided additional immigration penalties for prostitution
which were inapplicable to noncitizens who committed other crimes, including
68. 45 CONG. REC. 547 (1910) (statement of Rep. Cox).
69. Id. But see 45 CONG. REC. 548 (1910) (statement of Rep. Mann) (“[U]nder the provision if
an alien woman comes here innocent and young and an American citizen debauches her, she is to be
sent abroad on the world, although the fault is laid at our door; . . . [s]educed by an American citizen,
led by an American citizen into prostitution, she would be sent out of the country by this enlightened
country.”).
70. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United
States), ch. 1134, § 39, 34 Stat. 898 (creating Dillingham Commission for study of immigration).
71. U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, REPORT ON THE IMPORTATION AND HARBORING OF
WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, S. DOC. No. 61-196, at 36–38 (1909).
72. Id. at 37.
73. Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874.
74. S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 66 (1950).
75. See 52 CONG. REC. 348 (1914) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“Against the exclusion of that class
of people [including prostitutes] there is not now and has not been a single word of protest upon the
floor of the Senate.”); see also id. (describing prostitutes as in a class of noncitizens who are “evilly
disposed, . . . vicious, . . . [and] wicked.”).
76. See S. REP. NO. 63-355, at 4 (1914) (explaining that the purpose of the substitution of
“persons” for “women and girls” in the “immorality” exclusion grounds was “to include males as well
as females in the class”). Compare § 3, 39 Stat. 874, with White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 2,
36 Stat. 263 (1910). The classes of excludable aliens enumerated in the 1917 Act remained in effect until
1952. See S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 335 (1950) (“The excludable classes were assembled in the act of
February 5, 1917, which is presently in effect” (citation omitted).).
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violent crimes, showing Congress still considered prostitution to be one of the most
serious crimes for immigration purposes.77 First, this Act marked as deportable any
noncitizen who had previously been excluded or deported as a prostitute or
procurer or for participating in any activity related to the business of prostitution or
importation for prostitution.78 Second, it disallowed relief from exclusion or
deportation for “a female of the sexually immoral classes” by denying such a woman
citizenship if she married a United States citizen after her arrest or her commission
of acts that would subject her to exclusion or deportation.79 Third, the 1917 Act
added criminal penalties for noncitizens who returned or attempted to return to the
United States after they had been excluded or deported under the Act’s provisions
“which relate to prostitutes, procurers, or other like immoral persons.”80 Other
criminal activity was not subject to this harsher treatment.81
Between 1917 and 1952, there were only a few changes to the statutory scheme
pertaining to prostitution. These changes continued the trend of imposing
additional immigration penalties on noncitizens involved in prostitution by making
them ineligible for certain forms of immigration relief.82
E. Immigration and Nationality Act ( McCarran-Walter Act) (1952)
The next major legislation after the 1917 Act was the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, which continues
to provide the framework for current immigration laws.83 This Act made several
77. § 19, 39 Stat. 874; see also supra text accompanying notes 59–60. The 1917 Act also made
harsher the penalties for crimes involving moral turpitude, providing for the first time for the
deportation of noncitizens who committed crimes involving moral turpitude. See § 19, 39 Stat. 874;
S. REP. NO. 352 (1916).
78. § 19, 39 Stat. 874.
79. Id. At this time, women who were not subject to the racial bars to naturalization
automatically received citizenship upon marriage to a United States citizen. See Act of Feb. 10, 1855,
ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604, 604; see also Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and
the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 419–39 (2005) (discussing the 1855
Act and subsequent laws on citizenship via marriage). There was some objection to an earlier version
of the provision, which more broadly prevented a “female of the sexually immoral” classes from
obtaining citizenship upon marriage to a United States citizen. See 53 CONG. REC. 5173 (1916)
(statement of Rep. Bennet) (“[I]t seems to me that the provision ought to be stricken out. . . . You are
putting under the chance of blackmail every alien woman who hereafter marries an American citizen,
although she may be chaste as the driven snow, because any [person] who has a grudge or prejudice, or
simply desires money . . . can cast a doubt on [her] citizenship . . . .”).
80. § 4, 39 Stat. 874. The 1917 Act provided for a term of imprisonment of not more than two
years. Id.
81. See id.
82. See Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, Pub. L. 68-139, § 214, 43 Stat. 153 (precluding
prostitutes, among others, from voluntary departure, which allows certain noncitizens in removal
proceedings to leave the United States without the entry of a final order of removal); Alien Registration
Act, § 20, Pub. L. 76-670, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 670–71 (1940) (precluding prostitutes, among others,
from suspension of deportation, which allowed immigration officials to exercise discretion to suspend
the deportation of certain noncitizens who were otherwise deportable).
83. Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. 82-414, ch. 477, 66
Stat. 163 (1952). This Act superseded the 1917 Act. See id.

First to Printer_Dadhania (Do Not Delete)

68

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/2/2018 1:40 PM

[ V ol. 9:53

changes to the prostitution-related provisions but retained some of the language
from prior legislation.84
The McCarran-Walter Act expanded penalties for prostitution-related
activities in several ways. First, the Act expanded the classes of noncitizens who are
ineligible to receive visas and who are excluded from admission to include those
who “have engaged in prostitution, or aliens coming to the United States solely,
principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution.”85 This Act newly barred
noncitizens who had engaged in prostitution in the past, whereas prior legislation
focused on present conduct through its exclusion of “prostitutes.” The Act further
broadened the scope of the prostitution exclusion provision by encompassing any
noncitizen who has engaged in prostitution as well as any noncitizen coming to the
United States to engage in the practice whether or not it be the noncitizen’s principal
purpose of entry, no longer requiring a noncitizen to be a “prostitute.”86 It also
precluded an additional class of noncitizens in a catchall provision for “[a]liens
coming to the United States to engage in any immoral sexual act.”87
Second, the McCarran-Walter Act widened the scope of the deportability
grounds related to prostitution, encompassing past actions related to prostitution as
well as prostitution after entry. Whereas prior legislation had made deportable “any
alien who shall be found an inmate . . . of a house of prostitution,” the McCarranWalter Act made deportable any noncitizen who became a member of the
prostitution-related exclusion class, in other words any noncitizen who “is a
prostitute, has engaged in prostitution, or is coming to the United States to solely,
principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution.”88 Despite the expansion of
84. See In re R-M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 392, 395 (BIA 1957) (noting that the 1952 version of the
procurement-related law “is exactly the same as the provision in the parallel statute of preexisting law,
namely, section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, except that the first word ‘persons’ was
changed to ‘aliens’”).
85. § 212(a), 66 Stat. 163, 182–87.
86. See infra notes 100–101 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of deporting a
noncitizen woman as a “prostitute”). This language specifying that prostitution could be an ancillary
reason for entry was included to overcome the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansen v. Haff, 291
U.S. 559, 562 (1934), which required that an “immoral purpose” be the purpose of a noncitizen’s entry
for the provision to apply. See S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 357–58 (1950) (recommending that “excludable
class should include persons who seek to enter the United States to engage in any illicit sexual act or
other immoral act, whether that purpose be the sole, principal, or incidental purpose of their entry . . .
[to] overcome the decision of the Supreme Court in Hansen v. Haff ”).
87. § 212(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 183. The McCarran-Walter Act failed to include language about
noncitizens coming “solely, principally, or incidentally” to engage in illicit behavior in § 212(a)(13). See
id. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s holding in Hansen v. Haff, see supra note 86, continued to apply to
this subsection. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR
EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 115–16 (Comm. Print 1988) (describing how § 212(a)(13) failed to
overcome the holding of Hansen (citing In re B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 1953)).
88. Compare White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 3, 36 Stat. 263 (1910), with § 241(a)(12),
66 Stat. 163, 207 (citing § 212(a)(12), 66 Stat. 163, 182–83). This section of the McCarran-Walter Act
also encompassed procurers, noncitizens who have received the proceeds of prostitution, and
noncitizens connected with the management of a house of prostitution. See § 241(a)(12), 66 Stat. 163,
207 (citing § 212(a)(12), 66 Stat. 163, 182–83); infra text accompanying notes 132–134.
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penalties for prostitution-related activities, the McCarran-Walter Act also
harmonized some immigration penalties for prostitution and other activities
deemed by Congress to be undesirable.89
In addition to changing the scope of the prostitution-related immigration
provisions, the McCarran-Walter Act also removed the last reference to gender in
these provisions.90 It eliminated the provision that prevented “a female of the
sexually immoral classes” from receiving citizenship if she married a United States
citizen after her arrest.91 Despite this change, legislators and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) continued to refer to sellers of sex as only women until
relatively recently.92
The legislative history of the McCarran-Walter Act reveals that Congress for
the most part did not reexamine whether prostitution continued to warrant severe
immigration penalties and whether it continued to be viewed as a serious threat to
United States society. Rather, the legislative history shows that prostitution was
assumed to be a serious crime. The Senate Special Subcommittee to Investigate
Immigration and Naturalization recommended without significant explanation the
expansion of the exclusion grounds to include noncitizens who had previously
engaged in prostitution.93 Senator Lehman, when criticizing the harshness of other
portions of the McCarran-Walter Act, drew the line at noncitizens involved in
prostitution, stating that “[w]e certainly should not permit the entry of subversives,
criminals, prostitutes, pimps, and persons of that character.”94 Congress continued
to lump prostitution, criminal activities, and subversive activities together as

89. See § 242(e), 66 Stat. 163, 211 (criminalizing the failure to depart or hampering the
deportation process after a final order of removal for a broader class of noncitizens than those specified
in the 1917 Act); H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 185–86 (1952); see also § 276, 66 Stat. 163 (providing
penalties for reentry for any noncitizen who was excluded or deported); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 220
(1952). The Act also specifically enumerated for the first time a list of conduct that precluded a
noncitizen from establishing good moral character. Such conduct included a noncitizen who is a
prostitute, has engaged in prostitution, or is coming to the United States to solely, principally, or
incidentally to engage in prostitution. § 101(f)(3), 66 Stat. 163, 172.
90. See 66 Stat. 163.
91. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., In re R-M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 392, 395 ( BIA 1957) (“It is well established that the term
‘prostitute’ relates solely to a person of the female sex.”); infra note 117 (providing quotes where
legislators referred to trafficked sellers of sex as women). The BIA is the administrative appellate body
within the Executive Office of Immigration Review in the Department of Justice.
93. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 358 (1950) (“It is the recommendation of the
subcommittee . . . that the excludable classes of immoral aliens should be enlarged to include persons
who have practiced prostitution . . . , as well as those who are so engaged at the time of entry as provided
in the law at present.”); see also 22 C.F.R. § 40.7(a)(12)(ii) (2003); 52 Fed. Reg. 42594 (Nov. 5, 1987)
(“The fact that an alien may have ceased to engage in prostitution shall not serve to remove the existing
ground of ineligibility under INA 212(a)(12).”).
94. See, e.g., 98 CONG. REC. 5113, 5115 (1952) (statement of Sen. Lehman) (“[D]eportation is a
harsh penalty, as harsh as any there can be. Yet under the McCarran bill, deportation is required not
only for dope addicts, pimps, prostitutes, hardened criminals, and true subversives, but also for those
who have misrepresented a material fact in a visa application or who arrived . . . at a place other than
the one duly provided by regulation.”).
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analogous conduct, and noncitizens engaging in such conduct continued to be
viewed as “undesirable[ ].”95
Even where legislative history recognized that prostitution may not be a
serious concern, it nevertheless recommended an expansion of morality-based
immigration penalties. One Senate Subcommittee Report noted that “these
excludable classes [immoral aliens] no longer present a serious problem . . . .”96
However, it went on to recommend that such noncitizens still be excluded because
“should they [the exclusion grounds] be eliminated[,] the problem would again
become as large as it was in the latter half of the last century.”97 A Senate Report
recommended enlarging “the excludable classes of immoral aliens . . . to include
persons who have practiced prostitution” and who “seek to enter the United States
to engage in any illicit sexual act or other immoral act, whether that purpose be the
sole, principal, or incidental purpose of their entry.”98 This suggestion ultimately
was adopted in the McCarran-Walter Act.99
The Senate Report also recommended broadening the scope of the
immigration laws to “include a comprehensive classification of immoral aliens
deemed to be undesirable [that] should be broad enough to include all aliens who
engage in sexual relations for hire regardless of whether they have other means of
support or other employment.”100 This recommendation came in response to the
concerns of an unnamed immigration official that a noncitizen woman who engages
in sexual activity for compensation “is not a prostitute as long as she has some other
vocation or work which she follows along with her practicing of prostitution, and
[that] it has been almost impossible within the past few years in this area to make a
[deportation] case on an alien prostitute . . . .”101 Despite this focus on making the
prostitution-related provisions harsher for sellers of sex, the legislative history again
did not consider the role of buyers in prostitution.

95. See 98 CONG. REC. 5090 (1952) (statement of Sen. McCarran) (“Senate bill 2550 also revises
those provisions of the law relating to the qualitative grounds for the exclusion of aliens, so that the
criminal and immoral classes, the subversives and other undesirables can be excluded from admission
to the United States.”).
96. S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 358 (1950).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 84–87.
100. S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 393 (1950).
101. Id. at 392; see also id. at 871 (providing a table of aliens excluded from the United States in
fiscal years 1940–1949, showing the number of excluded “[p]rostitutes or aliens coming for any
immoral purpose” as 24 in 1940, 7 in 1944, and 3 in 1948).
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F. Immigration Act of 1990 and Victims of Trafficking Violence and Protection
Act (2000)
The changes in the prostitution-related immigration laws since 1952 mark the
beginning of Congress’s recognition that forced prostitution may warrant relief for
victims in certain cases, and also that prostitution may not be as serious a crime as
previously understood.
In 1957, Congress created a discretionary waiver of excludability for
prostitution that was available to certain close relatives of United States citizens and
lawful permanent residents.102 The purpose of this waiver was “to prevent the
separation of families”103 due to the prior “inflexibility” of the 1952 exclusion
ground that encompassed past acts of prostitution.104
The Immigration Act of 1990 made the next most significant changes to the
immigration laws related to prostitution. First, it limited the application of the
prostitution-related inadmissibility ground to noncitizens who had engaged in
prostitution within ten years, whereas there was no such time limitation in the
McCarran-Walter Act.105 Prior to the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990,
the staff to the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy had
recommended the bar for noncitizens who had engaged in past prostitution be
completely removed, finding that “[t]he past practice of prostitution presents no
threat to U.S. society.”106 Although Congress ultimately did not adopt this
recommendation, it created a ten-year temporal limitation, showing a recognition
that past prostitution was not in all cases detrimental to the United States despite
some statements in the legislative history against loosening restrictions on
prostitution.107 In support of this provision, the legislative history shows an
102. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639; see also Act of Sept. 26, 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 655 (incorporating permanent waiver provision); Act of Oct. 3, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 919 (recodifying waiver provision as section 212(h) of the INA). The
waiver was available at the discretion of the Attorney General to spouses, children, and parents of
United States citizens and lawful permanent residents if the noncitizen’s exclusion would result in
extreme hardship to the qualifying relative and the noncitizen’s admission would not be contrary to the
national welfare, safety, or security of the United States. See 79 Stat. 911, 919; see also 22 C.F.R. §
40.7(a)(9)(iv) (2003); 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(a) (1988); 52 Fed. Reg. 42,593 (1987).
103. SEN. REP. NO. 85-1057, at 5 (1957).
104. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF
ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
ANALYSIS 115 (Comm. Print 1988).
105. Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5077.
106. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF
ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
ANALYSIS 116 (Comm. Print 1988) (quoting U.S. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE
POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: STAFF REPORT 757 (1981)).
107. See, e.g., Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 50, 56 (1987) (statement of
Mr. Nelson, Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner) (“[I]t is not clear to us that repeal
of the ground of excludability and deportability relating to prostitution is warranted. In practical terms,
no desirable objective is served by the admission of persons who have engaged in or who might engage
in such activity.”); H.R. REP. NO. 100-882, at 56 (1988) (“In the view of the Department [of Justice],
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awareness that women involved in prostitution could be victims of circumstances,
even if they were not trafficked or forced by third parties. For example, one
representative contemplated this ten-year limitation to benefit “young girls, young
women who may have been forced by [war], stuck with younger siblings to support,
who turned to prostitution as a result of these kinds of conditions.”108
Second, the Immigration Act of 1990 removed prostitution as an enumerated
ground of deportability, despite some objection.109 At the same time, however,
Congress added a ground making deportable “[a]ny alien who at the time of entry
or adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable
by the law existing at such time . . . .”110 The effect of this provision was to trigger
deportability for noncitizens who had engaged in prostitution within ten years of
their dates of entry or adjustment of status. Despite this addition, the 1990 Act
removed the McCarran-Walter Act’s broad language allowing for the deportation
of any alien who is a prostitute, has engaged in prostitution at any time, or is coming
to the United States to engage in prostitution.111
Finally, this Act eliminated the exclusion from entry of “[a]liens coming to the
United States to engage in any immoral sexual act.”112 The BIA speculated from the
“scant legislative history of the repeal of [this] section” that this language was

this change [elimination of the prostitution-related ground of exclusion] . . . would not be in the
national interest. Such activity is frequently associated with violent and other serious crimes.”); 132
CONG. REC. 27009, 27011 (1986) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“I do not think it is good policy
that we ought to open the door to the prostitutes . . . of this world even with a 10-year statute of
limitations . . . . I am not for the procurers and prostitutes of this world . . . to have unlimited access
to our country.”). Even a supporter of the ten-year limitation categorized sellers of sex as
“undesirables.” 132 CONG. REC. 27009, 27011–12 (statement of Rep. Frank) (stating he is “generally
opposed to the procurers and prostitutes of this world” and that “we are not talking about any automatic
entry of undesirables”).
108. 132 CONG. REC. 27009, 27011 (1986) (statement of Rep. Frank).
109. § 602, 104 Stat. at 5077. There was only limited discussion on the elimination of this
deportability ground in the legislative history. See Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 50,
52 (1987) (statement of John Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice) (“[W ]e object
to the elimination of section 241(a)(12), which deals with the deportation of aliens engaged in
prostitution . . . .”); supra note 107 (providing statement of Immigration and Naturalization Service
Commissioner Nelson criticizing repeal of prostitution-related deportability provision). The
Immigration Act of 1990 replaced the previous grounds of deportability related to crime, including the
prostitution-related grounds, with four categories of crimes: crimes involving moral turpitude,
controlled substances, certain firearm offenses, and miscellaneous crimes including sabotage, treason,
and Military Selective Service Act violations. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-882, at 41 (1988) (“The four
grounds in this category [criminal offenses] replace 241(a)(4), (11), (12), (14), and (17), which relate to
crimes of moral turpitude; drug violations; prostitution; firearms violations; and treason, trading with
the enemy and related crimes.”). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(A), with Immigration and Nationality
Act (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. 414, ch. 477, § 241(a), 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(A). A similar provision remains in effect today. See infra note 123 and
accompanying text.
111. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
112. See 104 Stat. 4978.
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removed because it “was deemed either obsolete or duplicative of other language in
the criminal and related exclusion category.”113
Another significant step towards the recognition that noncitizens involved in
prostitution may need protection was in 2000 when Congress passed the Victims of
Trafficking Violence and Protection Act (VTVPA).114 This law was passed in the
wake of increased awareness of and frenzy over human trafficking, particularly sex
trafficking.115 The VTVPA was multi-faceted legislation targeting human
trafficking. It created T and U nonimmigrant statuses for victims of severe forms
of human trafficking to allow them to remain in the United States to assist in law
enforcement efforts against their traffickers and for victims of serious crimes
including human trafficking, respectively.116 The legislative history is replete with
references to women forced into prostitution as victims deserving of protection.117
Although prior legislative history also recognized the potential for victimization,
Congress in this legislation provided for the first time immigration relief for victims
of trafficking through T and U nonimmigrant statuses.118
Aside from this limited relief, the prostitution-related immigration laws have
not changed significantly since their inception in 1875—although they have become
increasingly harsh, their basic substance and justifications remain the same.
Throughout their development, the laws have focused on sellers of sex as bad
113. In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *4 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014).
114. Victims of Trafficking Violence and Protection Act (VTVPA), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101–7114 (2000)).
115. See Erin O’Brien & Belinda Carpenter, Antiprostitution Agendas and the Creation of
U.S. Antitrafficking Policy, in CHALLENGING PERSPECTIVES ON STREET-BASED SEX WORK 257
(Katie Hail-Jares et al. eds., 2017). This law was lauded in the legislative history as “a solidly crafted
piece of legislation that addresses an urgent moral and humanitarian problem.” 146 CONG. REC. 7291
(2000) (statement of Rep. Gilman). One of the main criticisms of the law was that segments of the
United States government were conflating voluntary sex work and human trafficking. See, e.g., ALISON
BASS, GETTING SCREWED: SEX WORKERS AND THE LAW 88–92 (2015).
116. 22 U.S.C. § 7101; see also infra notes 173–174.
117. See, e.g., Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l
Operations and Human Rights, 106th Cong. 1, 3 (1999) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“Current law
and law enforcement strategies . . . often punish the victims more severely than they punish
the perpetrators. When a sex-for-hire establishment is raided, the women . . . are typically
deported . . . without reference to whether their participation was voluntary or involuntary.”); The Sex
Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United States, Hearing Before the Comm. on
Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., 106th Cong. 3, 33, 35 (1999) (statement of Rep. Smith, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) (“[W]e will finally treat the victims—those
women who have been exploited by the traffickers—for that which they are: they are victims. We
will provide some safe haven for them, but we will also provide humanitarian assistance . . . .”); 146
CONG. REC. H2684 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Gejdenson) (“These are clearly some of
the most vulnerable people on the planet: people who are impoverished, often; people who have not
had the opportunities to defend themselves.”); id. at 7293 (statement of Rep. Pitts) (retelling the story
of a sex trafficking victim who was ultimately deported to Mexico, and stating “if this country stands
for justice at all, we can do better for this girl”); see also id. at H2683–86 (daily ed. May 9, 2000)
(recounting stories of young women and girls who were forced into sex trafficking). Some of this
language, describing victims as unwitting and helpless, is reminiscent of the language used in the early
twentieth century during the White Slave Panic. See supra note 57.
118. See infra notes 173–174 and accompanying text.
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actors. As the next Part describes, current prostitution-related immigration laws
continue to single out sellers of sex.
II. CURRENT PROSTITUTION-RELATED IMMIGRATION LAWS
Under current immigration law, prostitution-related activities can trigger
several immigration penalties. There are three main provisions in the immigration
laws that encompass prostitution-related activities: an inadmissibility ground
specifically for prostitution and related activities, an inadmissibility ground for
crimes involving moral turpitude, and a deportability ground for crimes involving
moral turpitude.119 Under the inadmissibility grounds, a noncitizen can be denied
admission into the United States, either through the denial of a visa or entry at the
United States border.120 A noncitizen is subject to the inadmissibility grounds even
after a lawful entry into the United States when he or she applies to adjust status to
become a lawful permanent resident.121 The deportability grounds trigger removal
for noncitizens who have been lawfully admitted to the United States, including
lawful permanent residents.122 In addition to these three provisions, an ancillary
ground of deportability encompasses the prostitution-related inadmissibility
ground, triggering deportation if a noncitizen was inadmissible at the time of entry
or adjustment of status.123
Other provisions cross-reference these inadmissibility and deportability
provisions to trigger additional immigration penalties. For example, these grounds
can subject a noncitizen to mandatory detention during the pendency of removal
proceedings.124 A noncitizen who is captured by the inadmissibility grounds may be
unable to establish good moral character, which can preclude a noncitizen from
several immigration benefits including naturalization, cancellation of removal for
nonpermanent residents, and voluntary departure requested at the conclusion of
removal proceedings.125
119. INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (2012); INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
120. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
121. INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (making deportable any noncitizen who is
inadmissible at the time of adjustment of status).
122. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
123. INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A); see also supra notes 110–114 and
accompanying text.
124. INA § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1).
125. INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (listing persons who are not of “good moral
character,” which includes anyone who falls under the prostitution-related and crimes involving moral
turpitude inadmissibility grounds); INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1247(a) (stating that a naturalization
applicant must establish good moral character for the five years preceding the date of the application);
INA § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) (stating that a noncitizen who applies for cancellation
of removal must have been of “good moral character” for the ten years immediately preceding the date
of the application); INA § 240(B)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (stating that the noncitizen requesting
voluntary departure must show good moral character for at least five years preceding the date of service
of the Notice to Appear). The inadmissibility ground also can negatively affect eligibility for cancellation
of removal. See INA § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (codifying the stop-time rule, whereby a period
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This Part analyzes current immigration laws related to prostitution and shows
that these laws continue to target sellers of sex or have targeted sellers of sex until
relatively recently. This Part also shows that immigration laws are slowly starting to
recognize the potential for victimization in immigration law, as well as the fact that
prostitution is a low-level crime.
A. Prostitution and Commercialized Vice Inadmissibility Ground
The prostitution-related inadmissibility ground specifically references
prostitution and procurement of prostitution but does not encompass buyers of
sex.126 First, this inadmissibility ground targets noncitizens who are coming to the
United States “to engage in prostitution” or who have “engaged in prostitution
within 10 years of the date of application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of
status.”127 Although a conviction can be evidence of prostitution, it is not required
for a finding of inadmissibility—a noncitizen need only admit to facts that show
she falls under this ground.128 However, the BIA has held that offering to commit

of continuous residence terminates when a noncitizen has committed an offense in section 212(a)(2) of
the INA, which includes prostitution and crimes involving moral turpitude).
126. This inadmissibility ground also includes a catch-all for any noncitizen who “is coming to
the United States to engage in any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether or not related to
prostitution.” INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(iii). “Unlawful commercialized vice”
may include prostitution, gambling, illegal sales of alcohol, and narcotics addiction. See, e.g., id.; United
States v. Iqbal, 684 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining that DHS had initiated removal
proceedings against the noncitizen defendant, charging that he had come to the United States to engage
in unlawful commercialized vice through his brother’s illegal gambling enterprise); In re A-, 6 I. &
N. Dec. 540, 553 (BIA 1955) (explaining that the noncitizen was charged with participation in unlawful
commercialized vice, namely the illegal sale of liquor and gambling activities, but the charge was not
sustained because the record did not establish he came to the United States to engage in the unlawful
commercialized vice); In re B-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 98, 111 (BIA 1954) (citing addiction to narcotics as an
example of commercialized vice). No published decision has extended unlawful commercialized vice
to include buying sex.
127. INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(i). Prostitution is defined as “engaging in
promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire.” 22 C.F.R. § 40.24(b) (2018); see also In re Gonzalez-Zoquiapan,
24 I. & N. Dec. 549, 553 (BIA 2008) (applying this definition of prostitution to interpret section
212(a)(2)(D) of the INA). But see In re Ding, 27 I. & N. Dec. 295 (BIA 2018) (holding that “prostitution”
in the context of aggravated felonies in section 101(a)(43)(K)(i) of the INA is “not limited to offenses
involving sexual intercourse,” and defining it as “engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in,
sexual conduct for anything of value”). Offenses related to managing a prostitution business,
transportation for the purposes of prostitution, and trafficking are aggravated felonies, but simple
prostitution is not. INA § 101(a)(43)(K), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K). Additionally, the definition of
prostitution for the purpose of the inadmissibility ground requires “elements of continuity and
regularity”—a single act of prostitution is generally not sufficient. See 22 C.F.R. § 40.24(b); see also In
re T-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 1955) (“[T]o constitute ‘engaging in’ there must be substantial,
continuous and regular, as distinguished from casual, single or isolated, acts.”). However, the BIA has
interpreted “prostitution” in section 212(a)(2)(D) of the INA to allow a single conviction for
prostitution to trigger inadmissibility, contrary to the regulations. In re Arcos-Valencia, 2005 WL
952477, at *1 (BIA Apr. 13, 2005) (per curiam) (concluding the noncitizen was inadmissible due to one
conviction for engaging in prostitution).
128. See INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D).
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prostitution is insufficient.129 Notably, there is no statutory exception to this ground
for forced prostitution. But to protect victims of forced prostitution, the BIA has
read a limited duress exception into this ground.130 The duress exception may be
limited to noncitizens who have not been convicted, resting on the faulty
assumption that if a noncitizen was convicted, any duress defense must have
failed.131
Second, the prostitution-related inadmissibility grounds capture procurers of
prostitution but fail to encompass buyers.132 The BIA interpreted the term procurer
to mean “a person who receives money to obtain a prostitute for another person.”133
The BIA specifically held the term does not include “someone who solicits another
to engage in prostitution for himself.”134
B. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude—Inadmissibility and Deportability Grounds
In addition to the prostitution-related inadmissibility ground, the crimes
involving moral turpitude inadmissibility and deportability grounds also encompass
prostitution-related activities. Like the prostitution-related inadmissibility ground,
crimes involving moral turpitude jurisprudence reveals a troubling targeting of
sellers of sex, generally women—prostitution has long been recognized by courts
as a crime involving moral turpitude, but solicitation, offering to purchase or

129. In re Kum Cha Carter, 2007 WL 3318661, at *1 (BIA Sept. 14, 2007) (“[I]t is doubtful that
a conviction . . . of offering to commit prostitution satisfies a deportation charge that the respondent
engaged in prostitution” (quoting In re M-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 300, 301 (BIA 1954).).
130. See In re M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 251, 252 (BIA 1956); see also Kerry Q. Battenfeld, Note, Moral
Crimes Post-Mellouli: Making a Case for Eliminating State-Based Prostitution Convictions as a Basis for
Inadmissibility in Immigration Proceedings, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 619, 622–25 (2017).
131. See In re Applicant, 2009 WL 1742009, at *2 (AAO Jan. 16, 2009) (concluding that the
duress exception created by In re M- was not available where the applicant was convicted of
prostitution); Battenfeld, supra note 130, at 624–25; infra note 222 (discussing the recognition that
prostitution-related criminal laws capture individuals who are forced to sell sex).
132. See INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D). Specifically, this ground includes “any
noncitizen who directly or indirectly procures or attempts to procure, or (within 10 years of the date of
application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status) procured or attempted to procure or to
import, prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution, or receives or (within such 10-year
period) received, in whole or in part, the proceeds of prostitution.” Id.
133. In re Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 24 I. & N. Dec. 549, 552 (BIA 2008) (emphasis added). The
BIA reasoned that “Congress appears to have been primarily concerned with excluding and removing
aliens who were involved in the business of prostitution . . . .” Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added). However, the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), the appellate
body of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) within the Department of Homeland
Security, concluded that a noncitizen was inadmissible under this ground for offering or agreeing to pay
a fee to engage in sexual conduct. The AAO did not analyze the meaning of “procurer,” instead
assuming that it applied in that situation. See In re Applicant, 2004 WL 2897081, at *2 (AAO Apr. 16,
2004) (concluding that the applicant, who was convicted of offering or agreeing to pay a fee to engage
in sexual conduct, “was convicted of prostitution” under section 212(a)(2)(D) of the INA). This
decision is non-precedential and is not legally binding on the Department of Homeland Security, which
adjudicates some immigration applications, or on the BIA.
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purchasing sex, which is frequently done by men, was only more recently held to
involve moral turpitude.135
The crimes involving moral turpitude inadmissibility ground provides that any
noncitizen convicted of or who admits having committed a crime involving moral
turpitude is inadmissible.136 The deportability ground states that “[a]ny alien who . . .
is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or
10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status . . .) after
the date of admission . . . is deportable” if the crime is one where a sentence of one
year or longer may be imposed.137 Additionally, the INA makes deportable any
noncitizen who is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude at any
time after admission.138
The term “crime involving moral turpitude” first appeared in immigration law
in 1891, prohibiting the admission of noncitizens “who have been convicted of a
felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude . . . .”139
The term was used “to separate the desirable from the undesirable immigrants, and
to permit only those to land on our shores who have certain physical and moral
qualities.”140 Since 1891, it has continued to be present in United States immigration
law.141
“Crime involving moral turpitude” has not been defined in legislation or
legislative history.142 The BIA has interpreted the term “moral turpitude” to mean
“conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or
depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and

135. See BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN REFORM TRADITION 3–4 (1990) (“[W]e see a prostitution economy that expresses
social and sexual inequalities within society—women are overwhelmingly the sellers of sex and men the
buyers.”); Maddy Coy, Introduction to PROSTITUTION, HARM AND GENDER INEQUALITY: THEORY,
RESEARCH AND POLICY 5 (Maddy Coy ed., 2012) (“[P]rostitution disproportionately involves men
buying access to women’s bodies.”); Donna M. Vandiver & Jessie L. Krienert, An Assessment of a CrossNational Sample of Men and Women Arrested for Prostitution, 4 SW. J. CRIM. JUST. 89, 90, 96 (2007)
(finding that in 2001, 2,637 females and 1,382 males were arrested for prostitution according to the
National Incident-Based Reporting System).
The term “solicitation” can refer to “an offer to pay or accept money in exchange for sex.”
Solicitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). To avoid confusion, this Article will use
“solicitation” only when referring to an offer to purchase sex or to the purchase of sex.
136. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
137. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
138. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
139. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
140. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
115 (2007) (quoting Special Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., Rep. (ii)
(1891) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
141. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1952); INA § 237(a)(2)(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A); Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 898–99; Act of Mar. 3, 1903,
ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1515, at 350 (1950).
142. See Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 10 (Comm. Print. 1988)).
THE
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man, either one’s fellow man or society in general.”143 The BIA has explained that
whether a crime involves moral turpitude should be judged by standards “prevailing
in the United States as a whole, regarding the common view of our people
concerning its moral character.”144 Courts have also held that the conduct must be
committed with scienter.145 As a general rule, if the conduct in question is malum in
se or inherently wrong, as compared with an act that is malum prohibitum or conduct
that is only statutorily prohibited, it involves moral turpitude.146
There is no fixed list of crimes that fall under the umbrella of crimes involving
moral turpitude. Rather, adjudicators must determine whether conduct involves
moral turpitude using the categorical approach, which requires a complex analysis
of the elements of a criminal statute to determine whether all violations of the law
that have a realistic probability of being prosecuted involve moral turpitude.147 If
the law punishes conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, then under the
categorical approach, convictions under that law do not involve moral turpitude.148
Courts have concluded that several categories of prostitution-related crimes involve
moral turpitude, including prostitution and only recently, solicitation.149
1. Prostitution — It is long-standing precedent that prostitution is a crime
involving moral turpitude.150 But very few cases explain why prostitution involves
moral turpitude, instead assuming that prostitution is a crime involving moral
143. In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (BIA 1988); see also Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556,
561 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 139 (BIA 1989)); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384
F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004); Marciano v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th
Cir. 1971).
144. In re G-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 59, 60 (BIA 1941). See generally Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin:
Why Moral Turpitude is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 653–57 (2012) (detailing the history
and definition of the term “crime involving moral turpitude”).
145. See, e.g., Michel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“[C]orrupt scienter is the touchstone of moral turpitude.”); In re Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775,
777 (BIA 1968) (“[M]oral turpitude normally inheres in the intent.”). Some courts, when considering
crimes involving moral turpitude, have bypassed the inquiry of prevailing social mores, opting instead
to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude by the element of scienter to avoid grappling
with the more difficult question of assessing morality. See Julie Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1059–67 (describing how an analysis of scienter has become a “stand-in[ ] for
moral turpitude cases at the margins”). The cases do not provide coherent and reasoned justifications
for this departure away from an analysis of society’s moral beliefs. See id. (“The use of a scienter analysis
as a proxy for moral turpitude has accomplished a dubious objectivity at the expense of coherence.”).
146. See, e.g., Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Simon-Kerr, supra note
145, at 1059 & n.417.
147. See In re Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 831 (BIA 2016).
148. See In re Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 2016); see also In re R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 448
(BIA 1954).
149. Case law on whether prostitution-related crimes involve moral turpitude has been relatively
limited, as noncitizens can be captured by the prostitution-specific inadmissibility ground, and until
1990, could have been captured by the prostitution-specific deportability ground. See supra notes 88–
89, 109–111, 126–127 and accompanying text.
150. See In re W-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951). The AAO, on the other hand, concluded
in a non-precedential decision that prostitution does not involve moral turpitude because “if the sexual
conduct affects only consenting adults then it may not be a crime involving moral turpitude.” See In re
Applicant, 2008 WL 4051913, at *3 (AAO May 12, 2008).
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turpitude.151 Matter of W-, one of the first BIA cases to address whether prostitution
involves moral turpitude, concluded in 1951 without citations or reasoning that it
was “well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral
turpitude.”152 Subsequent courts of appeals decisions have cited Matter of Wauthoritatively, creating an echo chamber concluding without reasoning that
prostitution is a crime involving moral turpitude.153 Case law on other prostitutionrelated crimes, which can involve a higher degree of moral culpability than simple
prostitution, also has fueled this echo chamber, with courts equating prostitution
and other prostitution-related crimes to support the conclusion that all prostitutionrelated crimes involve moral turpitude.154
In 2018, the BIA revisited whether prostitution involves moral turpitude in
dicta in a case about cockfighting.155 The BIA summarily stated that prostitution “is
so contrary to the standards of a civilized society as to be morally reprehensible”156
because “of the socially degrading nature of commercialized sexual services . . . .”157
Like in In re W-, the BIA again assumed that prostitution involves moral turpitude.
One of the few cases that has attempted to explain why prostitution involves
moral turpitude is Rohit v. Holder from the Ninth Circuit in 2012.158 To ultimately
conclude that solicitation involves moral turpitude, Rohit reasoned that prostitution
is a crime involving moral turpitude because it “always involves sexual exploitation,”
unlike some other sexual crimes that do not involve moral turpitude.159 The decision
does not define exploitation, nor does it provide support for this sweeping
statement, which has been widely contradicted.160

151. See, e.g., In re W-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401. Generally, courts have assumed that crimes of “sexual
deviance” involve moral turpitude. See Simon-Kerr, supra note 145, at 1007.
152. In re W-, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 402; see also In re S-L-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 398 (BIA 1949)
(providing the Central Office conclusion that pandering is a crime involving moral turpitude because
of the “turpitudinous nature of prostitution”). An earlier case held that even forced prostitution was a
crime involving moral turpitude. In re E-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 505 (BIA 1943) (concluding crime of
“compulsory prostitution of women” involves moral turpitude).
153. See, e.g., Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2016) (affording In re W- Chevron
deference); Florentino-Francisco v. Lynch, 611 Fed. App’x 936, 938 (10th Cir. May 27, 2015) (citing In
re W- as precedent); Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); see also In re OrtegaLopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382, 391–92 (2018) (“Prostitution is unquestionably a crime involving moral
turpitude under the immigration laws” (citing In re W-, 4. I. & N. Dec. 401).).
154. See, e.g., Francisco-Florentino, 611 Fed. App’x at 938 (citing a variety of BIA decisions on
prostitution and other prostitution-related crimes to conclude that the “BIA has long viewed
prostitution-related crimes as morally turpitudinous”).
155. In re Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382.
156. Id. at 386. The BIA cited Rohit v. Holder for this proposition. However, Rohit’s reasoning
on why prostitution involves moral turpitude is deeply flawed. See infra notes 158–160, 273–276 and
accompanying text.
157. Id. at 386. The BIA provided no support or further explanation for its statement that
commercialized sexual services are socially degrading. See id.
158. Rohit, 670 F.3d 1085.
159. Id. at 1090; see also infra text accompanying notes 166–168.
160. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (describing choice to engage in sex work).
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Outside of the crimes involving moral turpitude context, the Supreme Court
explained why prostitution was immoral in 1908 in United States v. Bitty.161 Although
not controlling for crimes involving moral turpitude, Bitty still is instructive in
deciphering judicial attitudes towards prostitution by noncitizens. The Supreme
Court said that the root of immorality in prostitution stemmed not from the fact
that it involved a commercial transaction for sex, but from the fact that it involved
indiscriminate sex.162 The Supreme Court reasoned that indiscriminate sex had
detrimental effects on families and thereby on United States society, showing the
Court’s concern over safeguarding monogamous marriages.163
2. Solicitation — Although courts have long recognized prostitution as a
crime involving moral turpitude, they only more recently recognized solicitation as
such, even though states had started to recognize solicitation as a crime since the
latter half of the twentieth century.164

161. United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1908); see also supra notes 54–55 (summarizing Bitty’s
discussion of the “immoral purpose” language from the 1907 Act).
162. See Bitty, 208 U.S. at 401. When defining prostitution, the Court stated that “[i]t refers
to women who, for hire or without hire, offer their bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with
men.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Cox v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 49, 52–53 (1917) (collecting cases);
Commonwealth v. Cook, 53 Mass. 93, 97 (1846) (explaining that Webster’s Dictionary defines
prostitution as “the act or practice of offering the body to an indiscriminate intercourse with men”).
But see Cook, 53 Mass. at 97–98 (defining prostitution as used in St. 1845, c. 216 as “the act of permitting
illicit intercourse for hire, an indiscriminate intercourse . . . .”); State v. Stovell, 54 Me. 24, 27 (1866)
(defining prostitute as “a female given to indiscriminate lewdness for gain”); THOMAS C. MACKEY,
RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION, DISORDERLY HOUSES, AND VICE
DISTRICTS, 1870–1917, at 51–54 (1987) (collecting cases from the mid-1800s defining prostitution,
including those that did and did not include gain as an element).
163. See Bitty, 208 U.S. at 401 (“The lives and example of [prostitutes] are in hostility to the idea
of the family as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and one woman
in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our
civilization . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted).).
164. See DECKER, supra note 12, at 82–83; infra note 220 and accompanying text (collecting
sources discussing the history of solicitation laws). Earlier, some jurisdictions made it unlawful to visit
houses of prostitution. See, e.g., Batesville v. Smythe, 138 Ark. 276, 277 (1919) (analyzing a city ordinance
on prostitution that also criminalized “every male person visiting any room or tenement so used and
occupied for the purpose of illicit intercourse . . .”); Ex parte Johnson, 73 Cal. 228, 228 (1887)
(describing city of Stockton ordinance No. 229, which made it unlawful “for any person
to . . . frequent . . . any [locations] kept, conducted, occupied, or maintained for the purpose of
prostitution”); Brockway v. People, 2 Hill 558 (N.Y. 1842) (“Individuals in the habit of resorting to
[houses of ill fame] may . . . be punished as disorderly persons” (internal citation omitted).). However,
a Texas court held that occasional association between a man and a prostitute did not fall under the
vagrancy law. See Ellis v. State, 65 Tex. Crim. 480, 481 (1912) (“The [vagrancy] statute was intended to
reach a class of persons who associated with prostitutes as their equals, or who associated with them in
public, and was not intended to make a vagrant of a person who, at night, went occasionally to the
room of a woman with loose morals, and yet who at no other time was seen in her company.”).
Parallel to the immigration context, solicitation historically has been less commonly prosecuted
than prostitution. Additionally, buyers generally have been less frequently targeted for arrest than
sellers. See infra note 225.
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The first published decision to recognize solicitation as a crime involving
moral turpitude under immigration law was Rohit v. Holder in the Ninth Circuit.165
Rohit referenced prostitution in reaching this conclusion, holding that “[t]here is no
meaningful distinction that would lead us to conclude that engaging in an act of
prostitution is a crime of moral turpitude but that soliciting or agreeing to engage
in an act of prostitution is not.”166 Rohit reasoned that “soliciting an act of
prostitution is not significantly less ‘base, vile, and depraved’ than engaging in an
act of prostitution.”167 The court explained that “[s]olicitation is the direct precursor
to the act” and that “the base act is the intended result of the base request or
offer.”168 Rohit did not analyze whether solicitation is a crime involving moral
turpitude independent of prostitution. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have
recently followed suit, concluding solicitation is a crime involving moral
turpitude.169 These cases do not provide any additional rationale on why solicitation
involves moral turpitude, aside from its connection to prostitution.170
The BIA in a non-precedential decision also concluded that solicitation
involves moral turpitude.171 It so reasoned due to “the impact offenses such as
solicitation of prostitution play in the illicit sex trade, with the violator who solicits
a prostitute not knowing whether the prostitute is a ‘captive’ of a trafficking
organization, or controlled by a pimp or a more sinister person . . . .”172

165. Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012). An unpublished decision recognized
solicitation as a crime involving moral turpitude as early as 1996. See Ahmed v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 92 F.3d 1196, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 1996) (unpublished) (affirming the
noncitizen’s deportation order based on two crimes involving moral turpitude, one of which was
“prostitution as a patron”). Ahmed did not explain why “prostitution as a patron” involves moral
turpitude. See id. The BIA may have recognized solicitation as a crime involving moral turpitude as early
as 1947 in an unpublished case. See In re S-L-, 3. I. & N. Dec. 396, 397–98 (BIA 1949) (citing In re M-,
A-6030668 (BIA 1947)). In re S-L- cites In re M- for the proposition that “the crime of soliciting
prostitution involves moral turpitude.” See In re S-L-, 3. I. & N. Dec. at 397–98 (citing In re M-, A6030668). The ambiguity stems from the fact that the term “solicitation” can refer to “an offer to pay
or accept money in exchange for sex.” Solicitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Outside
of the immigration context, the Fifth Circuit recognized the “crime of soliciting for prostitution” as a
crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of the admission of a prior criminal record in a criminal
case. Thompson v. United States, 245 F.2d 232, 232 (5th Cir. 1957).
166. Rohit, 670 F.3d at 1090.
167. Id. at 1089.
168. Id. at 1089–90.
169. See Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2016); Gomez-Gutierrez v. Lynch, 811
F.3d 1053, 1058–59 (8th Cir. 2016); Perez v. Lynch, 630 Fed. App’x 870, 873 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2015);
see also Florentino-Francisco v. Lynch, 611 Fed. App’x 936, 938 (10th Cir. May 27, 2015).
170. See, e.g., Florentino-Francisco, 611 Fed. App’x at 938 (“If prostitution is inherently base, vile,
or depraved, so too is the attempt to engage a prostitute by solicitation. Both crimes share a similar
intent and result in the same act.”). However, the AAO concluded in a non-precedential decision that
patronizing a prostitute is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not involve a “vicious
or corrupt mind” and is not “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile,
or depraved.” In re Applicant, 2009 WL 3554141, at *3 (AAO July 1, 2009).
171. In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *6–7 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014).
172. Id.

First to Printer_Dadhania (Do Not Delete)

82

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/2/2018 1:40 PM

[ V ol. 9:53

Although there is recent case law on solicitation, crimes involving moral
turpitude jurisprudence on prostitution, like the prostitution-specific inadmissibility
ground, generally has not been critically reevaluated in recent times. One area of
immigration law that has seen some change relatively recently, however, is relief and
exceptions for noncitizens who are trafficked or forced into prostitution.
C. Relief, Waivers, and Exceptions
Although immigration law generally treats prostitution harshly, recently-added
provisions provide specific relief for some noncitizens involved in prostitution.
Noncitizens involved in prostitution may also be able to take advantage of some
general waivers and exceptions for low-level crimes. These provisions show some
recognition that prostitution can be a form of victimization and that it is not a
serious crime.
T and U nonimmigrant statuses are relatively new forms of relief available to
certain victims of human trafficking or serious crimes, respectively.173 Sex
trafficking victims can qualify for both T and U nonimmigrant statuses.174
Noncitizens who are forced into prostitution but not trafficked and who cooperate
with law enforcement may qualify for U nonimmigrant status as well as noncitizens
who may have voluntarily engaged in sex work and provide information relating to
prostitution activities to law enforcement.175
Waivers for noncitizens convicted of prostitution are available under certain
circumstances. These waivers allow a noncitizen to avoid some immigration
penalties. A noncitizen may apply for a waiver of most of the grounds of
inadmissibility, including prostitution, when seeking U or T nonimmigrant status.176
DHS may also waive prostitution for victims of domestic violence applying for relief
under the Violence Against Women Act if it was the result of force, fraud, or
coercion in certain circumstances.177
Some noncitizens involved in prostitution may also qualify for discretionary
waivers of the prostitution and crime involving moral turpitude inadmissibility

173. INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T); INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(U).
174. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii); 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(a) (2018).
175. See INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii); E-mail from Sabrina Talukder,
Staff Attorney, The Legal Aid Soc’y, to author (Aug. 21, 2018) (on file with author).
176. INA § 212(d)(13)–(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(13)–(14) (providing the waivers of
inadmissibility for T and U nonimmigrant status).
177. 8 C.F.R. § 204. This exception only applies if the noncitizen has not been convicted of
prostitution, implying that either law enforcement does not target individuals forced into prostitution
for arrest or that a duress defense in criminal court is sufficient protection from a conviction, neither
of which is always true. See id. § 204.2(c)(1); Francisco Zornosa, Protecting Human Trafficking Victims
from Punishment and Promoting Their Rehabilitation: The Need for an Affirmative Defense, 22 WASH. &
LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 177, 188–89 (2016) (discussing the shortcomings of a duress defense for
survivors of sex trafficking).
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grounds.178 Additionally, one prostitution conviction generally is not enough to
trigger the crimes involving moral turpitude provisions under the petty offense
exception.179 Lastly, immigration law recognizes that prostitution is not a crime that
is serious enough to warrant deportation of asylees.180 These laws are in stark
contrast to the harsh penalties that prostitution can otherwise trigger.
By providing waivers and relief for prostitution in certain instances,
immigration laws now recognize that prostitution is not always a serious crime and
that it can involve the victimization of sellers of sex.181 Regardless, current laws
continue to focus on sellers of sex as bad actors, a legacy of turn of the twentieth
century legislation focused on morality.
III. MORALITY OF SELLERS OF SEX
This Part analyzes societal perceptions of the morality of sellers of sex, and
how such views have changed since turn of the twentieth century. Sellers of sex
were previously viewed as threats to society and family due largely to the perception
that nonmarital sex is immoral, and because blame for prostitution was leveled only
at women.182 As consensual nonmarital sexual conduct between adults generally has
become permissible, both morally and in criminal law, society has moved away from
viewing sellers of sex wholesale as “fallen” women.183 Societal views on prostitution
remain complex, but with the move away from a moral framing, there is an increased
recognition of the economic motivations that often lead individuals to sell sex and
of the victimization of individuals forced into prostitution. There is also a
recognition of other more culpable parties in the activity. These recognitions are
evidence of a growing societal shift to no longer view sellers of sex as immoral.
A. Morality of Sexual Conduct: From Marriage to Consent
Changes in societal perceptions of prostitution and sellers of sex are relevant
to prostitution-related immigration laws for two main reasons. First, crimes
involving moral turpitude jurisprudence requires consideration of prevailing social
attitudes when determining whether a noncitizen’s conduct involves moral
turpitude.184 Second, the prostitution-related immigration laws developed around
the turn of the twentieth century as a result of morality-based justifications—to
178. INA § 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (providing a waiver of most of the grounds
of inadmissibility, including prostitution and crimes involving moral turpitude, for noncitizens applying
for nonimmigrant visas); INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (providing a waiver of, inter alia, the
prostitution and crime involving moral turpitude inadmissibility grounds for noncitizens applying for
immigrant status).
179. INA § 212(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A).
180. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
181. See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
forms of relief available for trafficking survivors, which recognizes women can be victims needing
immigration relief).
182. See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 145.
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keep undesirable noncitizen women out of the United States.185 Because these laws
remain on the books in essentially the same form, reviewing societal views on the
morality of sellers of sex is necessary to determine whether the underlying
justifications of the laws are still valid.
Societal change, however, is notoriously difficult to approximate, with many
open questions on how to measure morality.186 Although there are many proxies
for changes in societal views, this Part focuses on criminal law. Criminal law can be
a useful point of reference for two main reasons. First, it is a useful measure for
social change without overstating such change. Criminal law tends to be
conservative in the sense that it responds slowly to changes in societal views, both
in terms of penal laws themselves and enforcement practices.187 Second, criminal
law directly impacts the immigration system, with criminal activity triggering
immigration consequences.
In terms of both criminal law and prevailing social views of morality, marriage
delineated permissible and impermissible sexual conduct around the turn of the
twentieth century188—adultery and sodomy were not only socially unacceptable, but
generally also criminalized, whereas marital rape was not.189 Since the 1950s,
consent, rather than marriage, has become increasingly important when evaluating
whether sexual conduct is permissible.190 Consensual nonmarital sex is generally no
longer viewed as impermissible and immoral.191 Consent has affected the
185. See supra Part I. Part III focuses on morality since the late 1800s, since that is when
Congress passed the first prostitution-related immigration laws. See supra Part I.
186. Courts have recognized that it is difficult, if not impossible, for society to agree on issues
of morality. See, e.g., Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2010) (“There is simply no
overall agreement on many issues of morality in contemporary society.”).
187. The BIA has used criminal law to approximate social change in crimes involving moral
turpitude cases. See infra notes 249, 251–252 and accompanying text.
188. See Judith R. Walkowitz, The Politics of Prostitution, 6 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 123,
131 (1980); see also Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 781 (1988) (“By tying sex to procreation, the traditional view functions to cement
the relationship between biological parents and their children and to promote the family as the key
social institution.”). See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9–13 (1965)
(“Marriage is part of the structure of our society and it is also the basis of a moral code which condemns
fornication and adultery.”).
189. See Chamallas, supra note 188, at 781–82, 784–90 (describing “traditional view” of sexual
conduct, where the only acceptable sexual conduct occurs within marriage and ties sex to procreation,
as the prevalent legal view from the turn of the twentieth century to World War II); see also id. at 784
n.34 and accompanying text (describing laws punishing adultery and sodomy). Fornication (sexual
intercourse between unmarried persons), without aggravating factors, was considered “furtive illicit
intercourse or . . . immoral indulgence,” but was not uniformly criminalized in the United States. See In
re R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 452–54 (1954).
190. See Chamallas, supra note 188, at 790, 793–94 (describing the increase in prominence in the
United States legal system of the “liberal view” of sexual conduct based on consent after World
War II, which began to replace marriage as the “crucial determinant of the lawfulness of sexual
conduct”). See generally COTT, supra note 25, at 180–99 (discussing changing gender roles during and
after World War II).
191. See Chamallas, supra note 188, at 781–82, 784–90. One exception is extramarital sexual
conduct. But when extramarital sexual conduct takes place in the context of prostitution, the person in
the relationship and not the seller of sex is generally viewed as the culpable party. This contemporary
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development of criminal law, as much consensual sexual conduct previously viewed
as immoral is no longer criminalized or if the laws remain on the books, they are no
longer enforced.192
The treatment of prostitution by criminal law remains one exception to this
consent-based framework.193 However, the concept of consent has started to
inform societal views on prostitution. Individuals trafficked or forced to sell sex are
now almost universally viewed as victims who need protection, in contrast to views
around the turn of the twentieth century when such women were seen as immoral
and culpable due to their participation, albeit unwilling, in sexual activity outside of
marriage.194
The concept of consent also informs societal views on individuals who engage
in prostitution but are not forced or trafficked. Certain segments of society believe
for various reasons that no one can truly consent to prostitution and that it is thus
a form of violence against women.195 This position is supported by factions of
feminists as well as certain conservatives, including some religious conservatives.196
Feminists who hold this view believe that individuals who think they are choosing
prostitution are actually being coerced by structural barriers, including extreme
poverty and the patriarchal system.197 Conservatives who support this position
continue to limit permissible sexual conduct to the confines of heterosexual
marriage, and to view prostitution in terms of morality, finding it degrading to
women and thus not a true choice.198 Both groups view sellers of sex as victims who
view contrasts with beliefs around the turn of the twentieth century blaming sellers of sex for such
transgressions. See, e.g., supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text; infra notes 212–214 and
accompanying text.
192. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA
1861–2003, at 121–27, 164–65 (2008); Traci Shallbetter Stratton, No More Messing Around: Substantive
Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 769
(1998). Additionally, criminal law created new sexual crimes for lack of consent, namely marital rape.
See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1373 (2000).
193. See Chamallas, supra note 188, at 794 (“With respect to prostitution . . . , the liberal ideology
did not succeed in changing formal legal doctrine.”); see also Elizabeth M. Johnson, Note, Buyers Without
Remorse: Ending the Discriminatory Enforcement of Prostitution Laws, 92 TEX. L. REV. 717, 720–25
(2014) (detailing the history of prostitution-related criminal laws in the United States).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 68–72 (describing the incongruous practice of
recognizing women forced into prostitution as victims, but nevertheless penalizing such women under
the immigration laws).
195. See Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES
128, 132–33 (2007); Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform
and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1665–66 & nn.26–28 (2010).
196. See Chuang, supra note 195, at 1680–82 & nn.99–105; Sheila Jeffreys, Beyond ‘Agency’ and
‘Choice’ in Theorizing Prostitution, in PROSTITUTION, HARM AND GENDER INEQUALITY: THEORY,
RESEARCH AND POLICY, supra note 135, at 75–83.
197. See HOBSON, supra note 135, at 5 (“They [some feminist groups] . . . assert[ed] that no
woman freely chose prostitution—that extreme coercion, desperate poverty, or mental derangement
explained this phenomenon.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 281 (2011).
198. See Chuang, supra note 195, at 1665–66.
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should be helped to leave prostitution, but do not advocate for general
decriminalization or legalization, believing that criminal law can be used to target
others involved in prostitution to further the goal of ultimately abolishing the
practice, due to their view that it is harmful to sellers of sex under all
circumstances.199
Another segment of the population, including some liberals and feminists,
believe that individuals can consent to sex work, and find the victimization
narrative, which conflates sex work and trafficking, to be problematic and
paternalistic.200 These groups push for decriminalization and legalization of
prostitution, and believe that any enforcement efforts should be directed towards
trafficking and other forms of forced prostitution.201
Despite these differences in viewpoint, individuals who sell sex are
decreasingly viewed as the bad actors by both camps.202 This recognition can be
seen through some positive trends in criminal law, discussed below.203 There is also
increased recognition among both camps that sellers of sex, even individuals who
choose to engage in the practice, can be victimized with impunity because they are
often unable or unwilling to seek help due to risk of arrest and stigma.204
B. Societal Views on the Morality of Sellers of Sex Through the Lens of the
Criminal Justice System
The criminal laws in various ways reflect this societal shift in attitudes towards
sellers of sex, moving away from viewing the seller as a fallen or immoral woman.
Criminal laws prohibiting prostitution started to be enforced regularly against sellers
of sex in the early twentieth century, when the social purity movement gained

199. See HOBSON, supra note 135, at 5 (“Feminists have sought stricter enforcement of laws
against keepers and pimps, and . . . criminal penalties for men who buy prostitutes’ services.”); Chuang,
supra note 195, at 1669 (“[W]omen prostitutes should not be penalized themselves but instead should
be the target of rescue and rehabilitation efforts.”).
200. See HOBSON, supra note 135, at 220–22; Chuang, supra note 195, at 1671 (describing this
faction’s insistence “on a distinction between trafficking and prostitution”).
201. See Chuang, supra note 195, at 1670–71 & nn.49–56.
202. But some segments of society continue to view sellers of sex as immoral. See, e.g., ROGER
SCRUTON, SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE EROTIC 337–47 (1986) (arguing that sex
not for the purpose of expressing love is immoral); Trump Lawyer Rudy Giuliani Has No Respect for
Stormy Daniels, BBC NEWS ( June 7, 2018) (“Someone who sells his or her body for money has no
good name. . . . I may be old fashioned” (quoting former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani).); see
also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, BOOK III, PROVIDENCE, Part II, ch. 122 at 1–5
(arguing under natural law theory that sex outside of marriage and not for purpose of procreation is
sin).
203. The criminal justice system’s treatment of prostitution remains highly problematic in many
respects, however. See infra note 230.
204. See, e.g., Barbara G. Brents & Kathryn Hausbeck, Violence and Legalized Brothel Prostitution
in Nevada, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 270, 287–90 (2005) (“Fear of violence is very much a part
of the culture of prostitution.”); Roger Matthews, Female Prostitution and Victimization: A Realist Analysis,
21 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 85, 89 (2015).
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momentum.205 This anti-vice movement, supported by feminist and Christian
groups, endorsed the view that sex was for the purpose of procreation.206 They
advocated for legislation and enforcement against prostitution to protect families
and society from the moral threat of women who sold sex.207 By the mid-1920s,
every state had criminalized prostitution in some form.208
Even though the sale of sex was generally a misdemeanor like today,209 case
law referred to female sellers of sex as serious criminals, and antithetical to the ideals
of morality and womanhood.210 Courts described sellers of sex using language such
as “fallen” women211 and “wayward girls.”212 Such women were believed to
“present a greater single element of economic, social, moral, and hygenic [sic] loss
than is the case with any other single criminal class” because of their engagement in
a “vicious and degrading vocation,” steeped in “sin and shame.”213
Female sellers of sex alone were blamed for prostitution, and were singled out
by state penal codes as particular dangers to society until relatively recently.214 States
205. DECKER, supra note 12, at 61, 67–69 (describing the tolerance of prostitution before the
early twentieth century and the reasons for subsequently “ending toleration of prostitutes”).
206. See COTT, supra note 25, at 123–24 (“Purity reformers intended . . . to stamp out
extramarital sexual relations and to make sure that sex stayed linked to monogamous marriage and
childbearing, as fundamental Christian morality required.”). Feminists supported the social purity
movement because it “seemed to be an attack on aggressive male sexuality and the double standard [for
sexuality].” Walkowitz, supra note 188, at 131.
207. See COTT, supra note 25, at 123–24; DECKER, supra note 12, at 67–70 (“At the beginning
of the second decade of the twentieth century, a monumental and relatively effective movement was
instituted to abrogate the toleration of prostitution which generally existed in America.”); THOMAS
C. MACKEY, PURSUING JOHNS: CRIMINAL LAW REFORM, DEFENDING CHARACTER, AND NEW
YORK CITY’S COMMITTEE OF FOURTEEN, 1920–1930, at 26, 38–39 (2005); Timothy J. Gilfoyle,
Prostitution, in THE READER’S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 875–76 (Eric Foner & John A
Garraty eds., 1991).
208. See MACKEY, supra note 207, at 39; Charles H. Whitebread, Freeing Ourselves from the
Prohibition Idea in the Twenty-First Century, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 235, 243 (2000).
209. See, e.g., Coker v. City of Ft. Smith, 162 Ark. 567 (1924); State v. Phillips, 26 N.D. 206
(1913) (“Any female who frequents or lives in houses of ill fame, or who commits fornication for hire,
shall be deemed a prostitute, and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Cox v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 49
(1917). For a first offense, present-day laws provide for imprisonment from one day to up to one
year, and fines range from $50 up to $10,000, with this upper limit being an outlier. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-201 (2017) (up to six months and/or $50–$750); D.C. CODE § 22-2701
(2017) (one to ninety days, and $500); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14 (2017) (up to one year and/or
$2,500); WIS. STAT. § 944.30 (2017) (up to nine months or $10,000).
210. See, e.g., Milliken v. City Council of Weatherford, 54 Tex. 388, 394 (1881) (describing sellers
of sex as an “unfortunate and degraded class . . . fallen beneath the true mission of women”).
211. In re Carey, 207 P. 271, 307 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922); Milliken, 54 Tex. at 394.
212. People v. Jelke, 135 N.E.2d 213, 216 (N.Y. 1956).
213. Carey, 207 P. at 305; San Antonio v. Salvation Army, 127 S.W. 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Curran, 8 F.2d 355, 355 (2d Cir. 1925) (considering a New York
statute that “makes any woman a ‘vagrant’ who ‘offers to commit prostitution’” (emphasis added)); Carey,
207 P. at 271, 274 (holding “men cannot commit the crime of carrying on the business of prostitution,
except as accessories,” even where the relevant ordinance was gender-neutral); People v. Brandt, 306
P.2d 1069, 1070 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1956) (“Obviously a male cannot be a prostitute . . . .”);
Sumpter v. State, 306 N.E.2d 95, 100–01 (Ind. 1974) (“The Indiana legislature has made a policy
decision that prostitution is a significant social problem only among females. Such a decision is clearly
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subjected sellers of sex to prolonged detention for the ostensible purpose of
rehabilitation.215 A California court defended this prolonged detention, explaining
that sellers of sex “constitute[d] a menace to the morals and social welfare of
mankind” and that “[t]he right to quarantine . . . implies the right to continue the
isolation so long as the danger remains . . . for the laudable purpose of reclaiming
[the seller of sex] and destroying the probability of a subsequent renewal of the
danger.”216
One court even treated women who were forced into prostitution as
immoral.217 Even when there was recognition that a woman may engage in
prostitution “due to social maladjustments or to the abuse of her affections,” the
relevant criminal law still did not view her as “an innocent person” but rather a
person “steeped in crime.”218 The stigma and threat to society by women involved
in prostitution outweighed all other considerations, including whether a woman was
coerced, manipulated, or forced by environmental factors.
Although prostitution remains widely criminalized, the criminal justice system
has shed much of its previous morality-laden language to describe sellers of sex,
especially as views on nonmarital sex have changed. State penal codes no longer
single out women and sellers of sex for punishment for prostitution.219 States began
reasonable and, therefore, should be sustained.”); see also Jane H. Aiken, Differentiating Sex from Sex:
The Male Irresistible Impulse, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 380 (1983) (discussing the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s upholding of a gender-specific prostitution statute in 1974 and concluding
that “women’s use of [sexual] power creates a moral problem that justifies legislative action”).
Men were rarely arrested or punished for buying sex or engaging in prostitution themselves. See
BASS, supra note 115, at 30; HOBSON, supra note 135, at 34; see also People v. Edwards, 180 N.Y.S. 631,
635 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1920) (“[I]t has been the custom . . . to arrest the women and let the men
go . . . .”). Where state statutes did punish men, they were not subject to the same harsh penalties as
women. See Leffel v. Municipal Court, 54 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 569, 574 (1976) (“The act of her partner in
vice, while equally as nefarious, is neither commercialized nor continuous. It is proper enough to send
him to jail for his offense, but it is doubtful if the scheme of impounding him for purposes of
reformation would commend itself to the lawgiver.”).
215. Misdemeanors at that time were commonly punished by a term of imprisonment not to
exceed one year, but statutes allowing commitment to a “reformative” institution permitted
significantly longer periods of commitment for women convicted of prostitution. See People ex
rel. Duntz v. Coon, 22 N.Y.S. 865, 866, 870 (Gen. Term 1893) (recognizing that persons convicted of
misdemeanors are generally subject to imprisonment for a term not to exceed one year, but that the
relevant statute imposes imprisonment for up to five years for women convicted of a prostitutionrelated misdemeanor in a “house of refuge for women”); see also Carey, 207 P. at 271–72 (describing a
California law subjecting women convicted of prostitution to indeterminate commitment at an
institution aimed at the “reformation of delinquent women”). Such disproportionate “rehabilitative”
punishment for only women continued until at least the 1960s, when it started to be struck down as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8
(D. Conn. 1968).
216. Carey, 207 P. at 274.
217. See id. (“The fallen woman alone carries on the traffic [prostitution]. If others prey upon
her frailty, it is only with her co-operation—willing or unwilling.”).
218. Id.
219. See Johnson, supra note 193, at 723–24 & nn.46–47. One court expressly disavowed the
language of “fallen women” as “reek[ing] with a condescending attitude that has no place in today’s
jurisprudence.” See McNeil v. State, 739 A.2d 80, 94 (Md. 1999); see also Leffel, 54 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 569.
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to regularly criminalize solicitation in the latter half of the twentieth century,
sometimes with parity in punishment with the sale of sex, marking a distinct shift
in attitude towards prostitution.220 Sellers of sex also are increasingly viewed as
victims in certain scenarios.221 Many states have recognized that forced prostitution
should not be subject to criminal sanction by providing affirmative defenses as well
as vacatur and expungement of convictions for victims of trafficking or forced
prostitution.222 There is also an increased awareness that economic factors lead
many individuals to sell sex, evidenced by state rehabilitative diversion programs
designed to encourage sellers of sex to leave sex work.223
This view that sellers of sex can be victims has led to a slow shift in
enforcement against other parties involved in prostitution. Enforcement priorities
in some jurisdictions have shifted towards buyers, pimps, and traffickers, especially
as a result of increased concern surrounding sex trafficking.224 Although women
220. See Pantea Javidan, Invisible Targets: Juvenile Prostitution, Crackdown Legislation, and the
Example of California, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 237, 250 (2003) (describing how California
criminalized buying sex in 1986); Julie Lefler, Note, Shining the Spotlight on Johns: Moving Toward Equal
Treatment of Male Customers and Female Prostitutes, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 11, 16–17 & n.45
(1999); see also supra note 164 (discussing early state laws criminalizing visiting houses of prostitution).
221. See, e.g., State v. Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d 222, 240–41 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015),
aff’d, 881 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016) (discussing the pimp’s “control” over prostitutes and describing the
prostitutes as “victims”).
222. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-70-102(c) to 103(c) (West
2015); FLA. STAT. § 943.045(16) (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-302(b)(2) (LexisNexis
2017); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.01 (McKinney
2017) (“[I]t is an affirmative defense that the defendant’s participation in the offense was a result of
having been a victim of compelling prostitution . . . [or] a victim of sex trafficking . . . .”). See generally
Zornosa, supra note 177, at 184–85 (discussing state vacatur statutes and affirmative defenses for
trafficking victims). Despite some progress in the criminal laws to protect against forced prostitution,
there is still criticism that the criminal laws continue to target individuals who are forced to sell sex.
See, e.g., Amanda Peters, Modern Prostitution Legal Reform & the Return of Volitional Consent, 3
VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3–5, 20, 29–39 (2015); Amanda Shapiro, Note, Buyer Beware: Why Johns Should Be
Charged with Statutory Rape for Buying Sex from a Child, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 449, 461–62, 467–74 (2014).
223. See BARBARA G. BRENTS ET AL., THE STATE OF SEX 34–41 (2010); Chuang, supra note
195, at 1699–1702; Shdaimah et al., supra note 2, at 9; infra note 224; see also, e.g., SARAH
SCHWEIG ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, PROSTITUTION DIVERSION PROGRAMS
3–5, 9–10 (2012), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/CI_Prostitution
%207.5.12%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL6U-XXM9].
224. See, e.g., Sara Jean Green, ‘Buyer Beware’: Early Success for Initiative Targeting Johns Instead
of Prostitutes, SEATTLE TIMES, May 16, 2015, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/
buyer-beware-early-success-for-initiative-targeting-johns-instead-of-prostitutes/ (reporting 2014 as the
first year when “patronizing charges outpaced prostitution charges” (internal quotation omitted));
National Law Enforcement Coalition Arrests Record Number of Johns, COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFF. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.cookcountysheriff.org/national-law-enforcement-coalitionarrests-record-number-johns/ [https://perma.cc/W3QP-6LLH] (reporting the National Johns
Suppression Initiative arrested over 1,300 buyers of sex across eighteen states); see also Zak Koeske,
Dart Says He’s Committed to Combatting Sex Trafficking Despite Challenges, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2017,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/news/ct-sta-dart-back-page-adds-st-012220170120-story.html (quoting Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart as saying the police “respond to areas
where we know there’s prostitution going on[,] . . . see what we come across, talk to the women about
getting out of the business, and . . . try to get the ones we talk to to cooperate with us to find out if
there are bigger players involved here”). But see id. (reporting that since 2012, the Cook County sheriff’s
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engaged in street prostitution continue to be targeted for arrest at significantly
higher rates than male buyers of sex,225 an increasing number of jurisdictions are
engaging in enforcement efforts directed at buyers.226 Additionally, enforcement of
prostitution laws generally has decreased dramatically—national arrest statistics for
prostitution and commercialized vice decreased 55 percent between 1990 and
2010.227
Although blame has been moving away from sellers of sex, they still remain
active targets of criminal laws in most jurisdictions, complicating the question of
contemporary societal views on prostitution. However, the purpose of these laws
generally has shifted from punishing a crime against morality to protecting the
public order as the sale of sex is increasingly viewed as a victimless crime.228 Rather
than aiming to protect society from women who sell sex, many criminal laws now

office has arrested over 3,000 sellers of sex and johns, but only 37 individuals for human trafficking
and promoting prostitution).
Early laws, especially during the hysteria of the White Slave Panic, see supra note 57, also
criminalized prostitution-related crimes—such as accepting the earnings of a prostitute, pandering, and
keeping a house of prostitution—as felonies. See, e.g., People v. Bain, 116 N.E. 615 (Ill. 1917)
(considering an appeal from a conviction for being a keeper of a house of prostitution); Steven v. State,
150 S.W. 944 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1912) (considering an appeal from a conviction for pandering); State
v. Poole, 84 P. 727 (Wash. 1906) (addressing an appeal from a conviction for accepting the earnings of
a prostitute). But see Javidan, supra note 220, at 250 (describing California’s failure to comprehensively
outlaw pimping until 1998).
225. See Shay-Ann M. Heiser Singh, Comment, The Predator Accountability Act: Empowering
Women in Prostitution to Pursue Their Own Justice, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1035, 1062 (2007) (describing
the enforcement bias against women); see also HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990-2010, at 2, 4 (2012) (showing that the number of females arrested in the
United States in 2010 for prostitution and commercialized vice was well over double the number of
males). Women engaged in street prostitution are easy and visible targets, and police often use arrests
of such women to bolster their arrest statistics. See BASS, supra note 115, at 30–31.
226. As of 2012, 826 United States cities and counties had tried enforcement efforts directed at
individuals who purchase sex. See MICHAEL SHIVELY ET AL., ABT ASSOCIATES, A NATIONAL
OVERVIEW OF PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING DEMAND REDUCTION EFFORTS:
FINAL REPORT iii (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238796.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F89Z-2SQP]. In some states, there is parity between arrests for men and women. See Johnson, supra
note 193, at 726 n.61 (providing Wisconsin arrest statistics); supra note 224.
227. SNYDER, supra note 225, at 4 (providing arrest statistics). But see MEREDITH DANK ET
AL., URBAN INST., CONSEQUENCES OF POLICING PROSTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF
INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED FOR COMMERCIAL SEX IN NEW YORK CITY
(2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/89451/consequences-of-policingprostitution.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE83-TFFW].
228. See In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014) (“In the intervening period,
views regarding prostitution have indeed undergone a transformation in our society, and simple
prostitution in some states has become a regulatory offense and is a quality of life crime to prevent
public disorder.”); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2017) (disorderly conduct misdemeanor);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 706-640, 706-663 (2017) (petty misdemeanor). However, some states, like
Wisconsin, retain prostitution as a morality-based crime. Prostitution appears under a section in the
Wisconsin penal code entitled “Crimes Against Sexual Morality,” which also still criminalizes adultery
as a felony. WISC. STAT. § 944 (2017).
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aim to prevent attendant harms that may be associated with prostitution such as
drug use, violence, and disease.229
As illustrated by the criminal justice system, sellers of sex are generally no
longer viewed as immoral actors, as concerns over women’s sexual agency
threatening societal morality have diminished since the turn of the twentieth
century. This move away from a singular focus on the corrupting influence of
women’s sexuality has allowed for increased awareness of the economic motivations
and structural factors that lead individuals to sell sex, as well as a recognition that
individuals can be forced to sell sex. Although selling sex remains criminalized and
the criminal justice system’s approach to prostitution is far from perfect,230 criminal
law nevertheless reflects fundamental changes in societal views towards the sale of
sex.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
In light of changing societal views that generally no longer view sellers of sex
as immoral actors, this Part recommends statutory and jurisprudential reforms to
prostitution-related immigration laws, which continue to target sellers of sex. The
development of immigration laws on prostitution has stagnated since the turn of
the twentieth century, and does not reflect changed understandings of the
complexities of prostitution. Although there have been a few recent reforms
focusing on trafficking and forced prostitution, these reforms do not go far
enough.231 Reforms should be expanded to remove penalties for prostitution,
including the voluntary sale of sex, both in the prostitution inadmissibility ground
and in crimes involving moral turpitude jurisprudence.

229. See Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 204, at 274; Ronald John Weitzer, The Politics of
Prostitution in America, in SEX FOR SALE 159–80 (2000); see also State v. Schultz, 582 N.W.2d 113, 117
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a prostitution statute where the “clear secular purpose [was] to protect
public health and welfare, to prevent other forms of prostitution, and to prevent criminal activity
associated with prostitution”); cf. NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 441A010-A325, 441A775-A815 (2016)
(requiring the regular screening of sex workers in licensed brothels to prevent the spread of sexually
transmitted infections).
230. One major problem is the continued disproportionate targeting of minority women for
arrest. See SNYDER, supra note 225, at 2, 4 (providing arrest statistics); see also DANK ET AL., supra note
227, at 3 (describing how “broken windows policing” led to increased targeting of minority women for
prostitution arrests); Johnson, supra note 193, at 726 & nn.63–67 (collecting cases where defendants on
trial for prostitution cited statistics showing enforcement targeting women). Another major problem is
police practices that lead to the potential for police abuse and increased victimization of sellers of sex,
such as those that allow officers to engage in sexual contact with suspected sellers of sex prior to
making an arrest. See Jenavieve Hatch, Sex Workers in Alaska Say Cops Are Abusing Their Power to
Solicit Sex Acts, HUFFPOST (Aug. 17, 2017, 12:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sexworkers-in-alaska-say-cops-are-abusing-their-power-to-solicit-sex_us_596e1d26e4b010d77673e488
[https://perma.cc/ZP9L-CSCX].
231. See supra text accompanying notes 114–118, 173–180.

First to Printer_Dadhania (Do Not Delete)

92

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/2/2018 1:40 PM

[ V ol. 9:53

A. Prostitution-Related Inadmissibility Ground
Prostitution should no longer be an explicit inadmissibility ground under
section 212(a)(2)(D) of the INA. This provision should also include a carve out for
the sale of sex in the provision encompassing unlawful commercialized vice. Such
reforms are necessary because first, this provision, grounded in morality, has not
been reconsidered since its inception over a century ago, despite changing societal
views on sellers of sex. Second, prostitution should not be a ground of
inadmissibility when solicitation is not.232 Finally, this ground should not target
sellers of sex because its application can be inconsistent and biased, as it does not
require a conviction.
First, Congress should remove prostitution from the inadmissibility grounds
in light of changed views on prostitution and consensual sexual activity generally.
This ground was developed around the turn of the twentieth century to protect
United States citizens from the perceived immorality of sellers of sex.233 It has not
been critically reexamined, and remains a relic of anachronistic morality-based
immigration legislation, potentially subjecting all sellers of sex, even those who may
have been forced or coerced, to penalties.234 By contrast, the evolution of criminal
laws shows that sellers of sex generally are no longer considered serious threats to
morality and are no longer viewed as seeking to corrupt society and families.235
Indeed, prostitution is legal in a handful of local jurisdictions in the United States.236
But even though prostitution laws continue to be enforced in most United States
jurisdictions, there is a growing recognition that individuals selling sex are not as
culpable as they were once thought to be, even when they choose sex work, and
that they can be victims.237 Additionally, criminal laws have started to recognize
exceptions for individuals forced into prostitution, unlike this inadmissibility
ground.238 Subjecting noncitizens who engage in prostitution to the harsh penalties
triggered by this inadmissibility ground thus runs counter to contemporary
perspectives on the culpability and dangerousness of sellers of sex.
232. This Article is not proposing, however, that solicitation be added as a ground of
inadmissibility to conform its treatment to that of prostitution under the immigration laws. Although
there is disagreement on the culpability of buyers of sex, see supra notes 220, 224–227 and accompanying
text, changes in societal views on consensual sexual activity generally, see supra Part III.A, counsel against
creating additional immigration restrictions related to sexual morality. Moreover, this Article not only
advocates for comparable treatment for sellers and buyers of sex, but also for removal of immigration
penalties for sellers of sex. See infra notes 233–276 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Part I.
234. But see supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text (discussing a limited duress exception).
Other terms in the INA are also relics of the past, including “habitual drunkard” and “crimes involving
moral turpitude.” See INA § 101(f)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) (2012); see also Holper, supra note 144,
at 653–57 (detailing the history of the term “crime involving moral turpitude”). See generally
Jayesh M. Rathod, Distilling Americans: The Legacy of Prohibition on U.S. Immigration Law, 51
HOUS. L. REV. 781 (2013) (discussing the history of alcohol-related provisions in immigration law).
235. See supra Part III.B.
236. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 201.354, 244.345 (2017).
237. See supra Part III.
238. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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Congress has in the past eliminated immigration penalties for some consensual
sexual conduct, recognizing that these laws no longer reflected societal views on the
activity. For example, Congress removed the homosexuality inadmissibility ground
even before the Supreme Court ruled that consensual homosexual conduct is
constitutionally protected.239 The Immigration Act of 1917 first excluded
homosexuals from the United States under a provision that prohibited the
admission of “persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority” certified by a
physician to be “mentally . . . defective.”240 Homosexuality continued to be subject
to immigration penalties until 1990 under “psychopathic personality” and “sexual
deviation” grounds.241 Prior to the enactment of the 1990 legislation, a
Congressional Report explained that “changing attitudes in American society and
within the medical community toward . . . sexual orientation require a modification
of the statute in order to prevent the perpetuation of unfair stigmas, and to ensure
that fundamental notions of human dignity are respected.”242 The Report
recommended the repeal of the “sexual deviation” ground “to make it clear that the
United States does not view personal decision about sexual orientation as a danger
to other people in our society.”243 Similar to how homosexuality is no longer
considered a danger to society, sellers of sex are generally no longer viewed by
society as dangerous and immoral.
Second, prostitution should no longer be an inadmissibility ground because
solicitation, the “direct precursor” to prostitution, is not explicitly such a ground.244
There is no meaningful reason why prostitution should be an inadmissibility ground
when solicitation is not. Moreover, contemporary understanding is that buyers are
just as, if not more, culpable than sellers of sex.245 Nevertheless, if buyers of sex do

239. See Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Although the legislative history reflects concerns over how the
American public would view the removal of this ground, Congress nevertheless eliminated it. See,
e.g., STAFF OF H. & S. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
THE NATIONAL INTEREST 349 (Comm. Print 1981) (stating the concern of some members of the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy that the “media would focus on such proposed
changes as eliminating the bar against homosexuals” and recognizing “the controversial nature of some
of the proposed recommendations on grounds of exclusion”).
240. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (repealed 1952).
241. See 104 Stat. 4978; Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 911; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976 and
Supp. V 1981); Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967) (“The
legislative history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended
the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include homosexuals . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 955 (1990)
(Conf. Rep.). See generally Robert Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities for
Gay and Lesbian Immigration, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439 (1994) (discussing the history of the
exclusion of homosexuals).
242. H.R. REP. NO. 100-882, at 19 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). Unlike prostitution, which is a criminal
exclusion, the “psychopathic personality” ground was considered to be a health-related exclusion. See
id. at 19–20 (“Not only is this provision out of step with current notions of privacy and personal dignity,
it is also inconsistent with contemporary phychiatric [sic] theories.”).
243. Id. at 20.
244. See Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2012).
245. See supra notes 220, 224–226 and accompanying text.
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not warrant a specific inadmissibility ground in the immigration laws, neither should
sellers.
Third, Congress should eliminate prostitution as an inadmissibility ground
because it presents administrability problems that create inconsistent and biased
enforcement. The prostitution inadmissibility ground captures conduct that may be
legal in other jurisdictions, both abroad and in parts of the United States.246
Accordingly, individuals engaging in lawful conduct may be subject to immigration
penalties. Additionally, there is no bright-line test to determine whether a
noncitizen’s conduct falls under this ground—a conviction is not necessary.247 If a
noncitizen has no convictions, a government official must determine in some other
way whether he or she has sold sex in the past, or even more challenging, whether
he or she will sell sex in the future. Like criminal laws that permit police to arrest
individuals for intent to commit prostitution, which are criticized for allowing police
to arrest individuals who “look like prostitutes,” this indeterminate standard too can
lead to abuses and stereotyping by officials trying to determine whether this ground
applies.248 In light of the above reasons, Congress should eliminate prostitution as
an inadmissibility ground.
B. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
Not only should Congress remove prostitution from the inadmissibility
grounds, adjudicators should also conclude prostitution is no longer a crime
involving moral turpitude. The very definition of crimes involving moral turpitude
not only allows for, but requires, the reexamination of whether conduct involves
246. See 22 C.F.R. § 40.7(a)(12)(iii) (1990) (“A person who comes under one or more of the
categories of persons described in INA 212(a)(12) is ineligible to receive a visa under that section even
if the acts engaged in are not prohibited under the laws of the foreign country where the acts
occurred.”); Visas; Regulations and Documentation Pertaining to Both Nonimmigrants and Immigrants
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,590-01, 42,594 (Nov. 5, 1987) (same);
supra text accompanying notes 126–131 (discussing the text of the prostitution inadmissibility ground).
247. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. But even if a conviction was required, the
enforcement of prostitution-related criminal laws has a racial and gender bias. See supra note 230. The
exclusion grounds that captured homosexuality were criticized for similar reasons related to inconsistent
application. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. & S. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 238 (Comm. Print 1981) (“Others [members of the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy] believe that such language as “mental defect” or
“sexual deviation” is too vague for consistent, equitable interpretation . . . .”).
248. See Karen Struening, Walking While Wearing a Dress: Prostitution Loitering Ordinances and
the Policing of Christopher Street, 3 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 16, 18–19, 46 (2016); Sex Workers at
Risk: Condoms as Evidence of Prostitution in Four US Cities, HUM. RTS. WATCH ( July 19,
2012), http://www.hrw.org/node/108771/section/2 [https://perma.cc/NN3K-RVVK] (“Police
stops . . . are often a result of profiling, a practice of targeting individuals as suspected offenders for
who they are, what they are wearing and where they are standing, rather than on the basis of any
observed illegal activity.”); see also SEN. REP. NO. 61-196, at 19 (1909) (describing how immigration
officials must judge women at ports of entry “mainly by their appearance and the stories they
tell”); GARDNER, supra note 35, at 52–57 (“[I]mmigration officials attempted to discern immoral from
moral [Chinese] women through careful observation of women’s appearance and their behavior and
repeated interrogation of their testimony.”); Abrams, supra note 13, at 682–83 (discussing the
stereotyping of Chinese women when determining their involvement in prostitution).
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moral turpitude in light of society’s changed moral views.249 Upon such a
reexamination of the sale of sex, adjudicators should conclude that it does not
categorically involve moral turpitude in light of contemporary understandings of the
victimization of sellers of sex as well as their motivations, which show that their
conduct is generally no longer considered base, vile, or depraved.
Case law has recognized this need to review whether prostitution is still a crime
involving moral turpitude. Acknowledging that it had been “many years” since it
had addressed this question “in a precedent decision,” the BIA noted a recent
“transformation” of views on prostitution.250 Using the criminal justice system as a
proxy for societal views, it noted that “simple prostitution in some states [is
becoming] a regulatory offense and . . . a quality of life crime to prevent public
disorder.”251 The Sixth Circuit also recognized society’s changing attitudes towards
prostitution.252 It went so far as to conclude that “there is now increased attention
to the question of whether and to what extent prostitution should be
criminalized.”253 Both, however, declined the opportunity to reconsider whether
prostitution involves moral turpitude in light of contemporary perspectives.254
Rather than shirk the thorny question whether prostitution involves moral
turpitude in contemporary times, adjudicators should confront this issue head on,
and conclude that the sale of sex is no longer a crime involving moral turpitude.
Prostitution does not categorically involve moral turpitude because state
criminal laws capture conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, namely the
sale of sex by individuals who are trafficked or otherwise forced to sell sex. If not
all conduct that may be realistically prosecuted under the criminal statute involves

249. The BIA has explained that “the nature of a crime is measured against contemporary moral
standards and may be susceptible to change based on the prevailing views of society.” In re TorresVarela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83 (BIA 2001) (emphasis added); see also In re Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 99, 100 n.2 (BIA 2013), rev’d, 834 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2016), remanded to 27 I. & N. Dec. 382
(BIA 2018) (holding courts must consider “the evolving nature of what conduct society considers to
be contrary to accepted rules of morality . . . .”). In 2013 and again on remand in 2018, the BIA
addressed the question whether sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in animal fighting constituted a
crime involving moral turpitude and used contemporary social norms to ultimately conclude that it
does. In re Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 390; In re Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 100 n.2. The
BIA reasoned that it involves “reprehensible conduct,” namely the “intentional infliction of harm or
pain on sentient beings that are compelled to fight.” In re Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 101–03. As
support, it cited the “increasing national consensus against this activity” reflected by recent laws
prohibiting animal fighting. Id.
250. In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7 (BIA Aug. 19, 2014) (citing Ortega-Lopez, 26 I. &
N. Dec. at 100 n.2). But see supra notes 153, 155–157 and accompanying text (describing a 2018 BIA
decision that states in dicta that prostitution is “unquestionably” a crime involving moral turpitude).
251. In re Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7.
252. Reyes v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[O]ur society’s—and the BIA’s—views
regarding prostitution and solicitation of prostitution may continue to transform.”).
253. Id. (citing Emily Bazelon, Should Prostitution Be a Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/should-prostitution-be-a-crime.html).
254. See Reyes, 835 F.3d at 561 (deferring under Chevron to the BIA’s precedential opinions on
prostitution as a crime involving moral turpitude, concluding that they were not unreasonable); In re
Sehmi, 2014 WL 4407689, at *7.
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moral turpitude, then a conviction under that statute cannot categorically involve
moral turpitude.255 Individuals who are trafficked or otherwise forced into
prostitution are routinely prosecuted under state laws criminalizing prostitution.256
Such individuals do not act with the requisite culpable mental state, nor can their
conduct be base, vile or depraved since their actions are not voluntary.257 Because
individuals who are trafficked and forced into prostitution are prosecuted under
state criminal laws, prostitution cannot categorically involve moral turpitude.
Additionally, prostitution is increasingly viewed as a form of employment,
with many individuals being forced to sell sex because of their economic
circumstances.258 Although prostitution remains criminalized, this cannot be the
end of the moral turpitude inquiry since “[n]ot every offense contrary to good
morals involves moral turpitude.”259 Something else is needed for a crime to involve
moral turpitude—a “vicious motive or a corrupt mind.”260 The sale of sex as a form
of employment does not reflect a vicious motive or a corrupt mind.261 Although
society at the turn of the twentieth century wholesale labeled sellers of sex as
immoral, contemporary understandings of prostitution show that sellers of sex do
not engage in prostitution to fulfill lustful desires or corrupt society.262 Because not

255. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text (describing the categorical approach).
256. See DANK ET AL., supra note 227, at 1–5, 10–11, 15–22 (describing arrests and prosecutions
of trafficking victims for prostitution); supra note 222 (describing the criticism that state criminal laws
capture individuals who are forced to sell sex). Additionally, in recognition of the fact that their criminal
laws are capturing individuals trafficked and forced into prostitution, some states have provided for
vacatur and expungement of prostitution convictions for such victims. See supra note 222.
257. See supra notes 143–146 (describing the categorical approach). Indeed, recent legislation
shows a recognition that prostitution can be a form of victimization through its creation of forms of
immigration relief for noncitizens forced into prostitution. See supra text accompanying notes 114–118.
258. See supra notes 200, 223 (describing sex work as a form of employment).
259. In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 190, 194–95 (BIA 1942). The Ninth Circuit went so far as to
conclude that in the present, “consensual sexual conduct among adults may not be deemed ‘base, vile,
and depraved’ as a matter of law simply because a majority of people happen to disapprove of a
particular practice,” and that “[m]ore is required for moral turpitude.” Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124,
1132–33 (9th Cir. 2010).
260. In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 194.
261. See supra notes 219–223 (describing contemporary understandings of the motivations of
sellers of sex).
262. The treatment of indecent exposure in crimes involving moral turpitude jurisprudence
bolsters this conclusion. When analyzing whether indecent exposure involves moral turpitude, the BIA
focused on intent, holding that it does not involve moral turpitude when there is “no indication whether
the exposure was to arouse the sexual desires of the parties concerned or with a lewd or lascivious
intent . . . .” In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. 79, 82–83 (BIA 2013) (quoting In re P-, 2 I. &
N. Dec. 117, 121 (BIA 1944)). This lewd intent “is what makes it ‘base, vile, or depraved, and contrary
to the accepted rules of morality.’” In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 82–83 (quoting In re Ajami,
22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (BIA 1999)). But see In re Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA 1965) (holding
that renting a room with knowledge that it would be used for prostitution or lewdness was a crime
involving moral turpitude).
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all instances of prostitution involve base, vile, or depraved conduct, prostitution
cannot categorically be a crime involving moral turpitude.263
Moreover, prostitution does not involve moral turpitude because it is conduct
that is malum prohibitum, as compared with an act that is malum in se.264 The Ninth
Circuit, when concluding that statutory rape was not a crime involving moral
turpitude, reasoned that the relevant criminal statute “proscribe[d] some conduct
that is malum prohibitum.”265 The Ninth Circuit so reasoned for several reasons. First,
it concluded the conduct was malum prohibitum because the sexual activity at issue
would have been legal if the adult and minor were married, as provided in another
section of the penal code.266 Second, the Ninth Circuit cited the fact that some of
the conduct encompassed by the criminal statute is legal in other states.267 Third,
the purpose of California’s statutory rape law “was not moral, so much as
pragmatic—they were attempting to reduce teenage pregnancies.”268 For reasons
similar to those cited by the Ninth Circuit, prostitution laws proscribe conduct that
is malum prohibitum. Prostitution is now a public order or regulatory offense in many
jurisdictions, aimed to maintain order and promote public health.269 Prostitution
also is not universally criminalized—it is legal in parts of Nevada and in other
countries.270 Because prostitution laws encompass conduct that is malum prohibitum,
prostitution should not categorically be a crime involving moral turpitude.
Finally, prostitution cannot be a crime involving moral turpitude simply
because the sexual activity involves a commercial transaction.271 Such a rationale
necessarily would encompass other activities like exotic or nude dancing that can
involve sexual contact, which, like prostitution, involve payment for a sexual
activity, albeit of a different nature. However, nude dancing, even where it is in
violation of local law, has not been considered a crime involving moral turpitude.272
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rohit v. Holder is illustrative of the problems
of concluding prostitution categorically involves moral turpitude and should not be

263. See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that statutory rape
is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude for several reasons, including the fact that not all
conduct captured by the criminal statute involves moral turpitude).
264. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between malum in se
and malum prohibitium and its use in moral turpitude analysis).
265. Quintero-Salazar, 506 F.3d at 693.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
270. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.354 (2017); Brief of Amicus, American Immigration Lawyers
Ass’n at 19–21, In re R-S-S- (BIA 2012) (describing decriminalization and/or legalization of prostitution
in other countries).
271. See In re Ortega-Lopez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 382, 386 (BIA 2018) (stating in dicta that
prostitution involves moral turpitude because “of the socially degrading nature of commercialized
sexual services . . . .”).
272. Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 79, 85–86 (BIA 2013).
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followed.273 Rohit explains that prostitution involves moral turpitude because it
“always involves sexual exploitation.”274 The panel’s conclusion seems to have
stemmed from the assumption that either all instances of prostitution are forced, or
that prostitution can never be a voluntary choice and thus is always exploitative.275
If the panel believed that all instances of prostitution are forced, this belief is
factually incorrect. Although prostitution certainly can involve sexual exploitation,
it is not the case that every instance of prostitution involves forced sex.276
Additionally, this reading results in the punishment of the party that is being sexually
exploited by triggering immigration consequences for noncitizens who sell sex. In
other words, by triggering penalties for a noncitizen who sold sex, the court’s
reasoning suggests that the noncitizen who is being exploited and forced to sell sex
is the bad actor. Even if the panel acted under the assumption that prostitution can
never be a voluntary choice, the same problem of punishing the victim arises.
Because sellers of sex are generally no longer considered a serious threat to
morality, and may be victims in certain cases, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
justify harsh immigration penalties for prostitution, especially in light of the
pragmatic and doctrinal problems identified above. Congress and the courts should
therefore take this opportunity to remove these outdated morality-based provisions
from immigration law.
CONCLUSION
Prostitution-related immigration laws are some of the last remaining vestiges
of morality-based immigration legislation enacted at the turn of the twentieth
century. These laws are outdated and fail to take into account contemporary
understandings, reflected in the criminal justice system, that prostitution is not a
serious crime against morality, but rather that many individuals involved in
prostitution are victims or sell sex for economic reasons. Additionally, prostitutionrelated immigration laws continue to unfairly impact noncitizen women, making
them more vulnerable to serious exploitation and abuse. These laws sow a distrust
of the government, as women involved in prostitution are reluctant to report crimes
to law enforcement for fear of penalties. Therefore, both to cleanse the law of the
gendered and outdated notions of morality that continue to underpin these laws,
and also to better protect this vulnerable population, immigration laws should
dispose of penalties for the sale of sex.
It is especially important to protect this vulnerable population today in light
of the Trump administration’s scapegoating of noncitizens. Vociferous rhetoric
273. See Rohit, 670 F.3d 1085. Although Rohit ultimately addressed the issue whether solicitation
involves moral turpitude, it referenced prostitution in concluding that it does. See id.
274. Id. at 1090. Rohit was attempting to distinguish prostitution from statutory rape, which the
Ninth Circuit has held does not involve moral turpitude. See id.
275. See supra notes 195–199 and accompanying text (describing the belief of some feminists
and evangelical Christians that prostitution cannot be a voluntary choice).
276. See, e.g., Valerie Jenness, From Sex as Sin to Sex as Work: COYOTE and the Reorganization
of Prostitution as a Social Problem, 37 SOC. PROBS. 403, 405–06 (1990).
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from the administration, especially President Trump himself, mirrors that from the
turn of the twentieth century, branding noncitizens as undesirable and threats to
American values. When he announced his presidential bid, Trump specifically
referred to Mexican immigrants as “people that have lots of problems” and who are
“bringing crime.”277 In a July 2017 speech in Poland, he spoke of threats to the
“West,” including “dire threats . . . to our way of life.” He specifically spoke of
“Americans, Poles, and the nations of Europe” working together to “confront
forces, whether they come from inside or out, from the South or the East, that
threaten over time to undermine these values and to erase the bonds of culture,
faith and tradition that make us who we are.”278 This rhetoric, which mirrors that
from the turn of the century, is being translated to action, resulting in widespread
targeting of noncitizens through immigration laws and policies. The Trump
administration has shown no restraint. Unfettered discretion has allowed the
government to use immigration laws against unpopular groups. During these
increasingly tumultuous times the reforms outlined in this Article will provide some
protection to noncitizens suspected of selling sex, an especially vulnerable
population accused of conduct society no longer views under the same lens as it did
around the turn of the twentieth century, by ensuring that they are squarely outside
of the freely exercised discretionary power of the Trump administration and are no
longer subject to immigration penalties.

277. Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST, June 16,
2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donaldtrump-announces-a-presidential-bid/ [https://perma.cc/BVP6-DAN9].
278. Trump’s Speech in Warsaw (Full Transcript, Video), CNN ( July 6, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/07/06/politics/trump-speech-poland-transcript/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z4HW-7AZG].

